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THE DEFENSE OF WALTER X. WILSON: AN
INSANITY PLEA AND A SKIRMISH IN
THE WAR ON POVERTY
By

RICHARD ARENSt

I.
INTRODUCTION

T IS COMMONPLACE to observe that with the best lawyer in
the world a man may lose a case that he ought to win for lack of
a happy pairing of merit and money. If his pocket is not sufficiently
well-lined, he will be unable to secure the kind of investigation that alone
is capable of establishing his case to the satisfaction of a trial jury.
In a criminal case, lack of money may mean not only loss of
liberty but actual loss of life. Whether or not Walter X. Wilson had
a good lawyer is in this light less material than whether or not he
had adequate financial resources to assert his innocence. What emerges
with startling clarity is that, but for the bounty of the National Institute
of Mental Health,' Walter X. Wilson would have gone to a penitentiary
instead of to a mental hospital.
In a series of cases designed to assess the operation of the Durham
rule, a project director of an undertaking financed by the National
Institute employed numerous psychiatrists and psychologists to assist
in the trial of various indigent defendants who relied upon the insanity
defense as their only escape from a criminal dilemma. In the courts of
the District of Columbia, such defendants thus became the beneficiaries
of expertise not only well beyond the reach of the indigent but also well
beyond the reach of defendants of modest income.
Walter X. Wilson's story is told in part as an illustration of the
adage that regardless of applicable legal doctrine - and the M'Naghten
rule would no more have affected the outcome of this case than Durham
"money talks." It is also told with a view to the statement of the
t

B.A., 1946, University of Michigan; LL.B., 1948, LL.M., 1950, Yale Uni-

versity; Professor of Law, Catholic University of America.
1. The funds for the psychiatric and psychological examinations in that case as
well as those for the completion of this study were made available under grant M-5009
of the National Institute of Health. A pseudonym has been substituted for the name
of the defendant. The number of the case has been omitted. The defendant in turn
has granted his consent to this publication.
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principle that the adversary system of American criminal litigation
depends upon more than good intentions, that is, it calls for a
balancing of resources between criminal defense and prosecution which
even the most advanced and up-to-date legislation has as yet failed
to provide.' Finally, it is told with a view to presenting a clearer
identification of the problems faced by counsel in the preparation of
the insanity defense, for again - regardless of the prevailing rule
of exculpatory mental illness in a particular jurisdiction - counsel
will generally face substantially identical attitudes within the hierarchy
of the state mental institution and experience much the same type
of pitfall in communication with the experts of his own selection
which were encountered in the case of United States v. Wilson.
A detailed recital of the preliminary events followed by the
approximation of a trial diary, admittedly affected by the perspective
of the partisanship of defense counsel, was believed best suited for
these purposes.
2. There is little reason to share the sanguine view of former Attorney General
Robert Kennedy as to the effect of the new Criminal Justice Act. As expressed by him:
• * . the bill establishes an adequate defense standard under which representation
in a criminal case is recognized as involving more than a lawyer alone. It
requires making available to counsel those auxiliary investigative experts, and
other services frequently essential to ascertaining the facts and making judgments
upon which to prepare and present the defendant's case. The plan adopted in
each district may provide for these services to be furnished either through salaried
staff personnel, personnel retained specially in each case, or a combination of
these means.
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
1964, Vol. 2, p. 2995. Legislative History of Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 2990.
Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b) money has been previously disbursed by the
Department of Justice for expert witnesses. FZD. R. CRIM. P. 28 has been administered with the aid of a $4000 budget for disbursement to experts. Judges decided
when expert witnesses were needed. See United States Code Congressional and
Administrative News, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1964.
Criminal Justice Act 88-455; 78 Stat. 552, designated as An Act to promote the
cause of criminal justice by providing for the representation of defendants who are
financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the courts of
the United States has secured the following:
18 U.S.C. § 300(6) (A). Adequate representation of defendants.
(a) Representation under each plan shall include counsel and investigator, expert,
and other services necessary to an adequate defense.
(b) Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative,
expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense in his case may
request them in an ex parte application.
The compensation .

.

. shall not exceed $300, exclusive of reimbursement

for expenses reasonably incurred.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 has taken the place of Rule 17(b). A member
of the budget department of the Supreme Court has declared that he has no idea as
to what the annual appropriation will be - but that he thought it might approximate $400,000.
There appears to be considerable controversy over how much is needed for the
program. Some have said that $3,000,000 would be enough; others that $20,000,000
would not be.
A staff member of the Justice Department has declared that under Rule 17,
the amount allotted for all witnesses in appropriations for fiscal year 1965-66 was
$2,800,000. This encompasses all witnesses including experts. There is absolutely no
way to distinguish how much has been paid to psychiatrists in indigent criminal cases.
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II.
PRELIMINARY EVENTS

At about 3:00 a.m. on Thursday, June 9, 1960, Precinct No. 8
of the Washington D.C. Police Department was informed that a stolen
car had been seen passing through a red light on Missouri Avenue.8
A police patrol car was alerted and pursued a Chevrolet station
wagon, which had been identified as the stolen car. As the police car
pulled abreast of the station wagon, a police officer motioned it over
to the curb. The station wagon, driven by 19 year old Walter X.
Wilson, sped away.
The police officer sounded his siren and the chase began. Walter
X. Wilson was driving his car at an estimated speed of 80 miles per
hour and was weaving from side to side on the street.4
The blocking of the roadway by a police car in advance of Wilson's
careening vehicle as an alternative to pursuit was thought by an officer
of the Accident Investigation Unit as "taking ... his own life in...
[his] hands and maybe anybody else's life who was with . . . [him]."'

The pursuit covered approximately three miles over a winding
road, moving uphill and then down again. 6
In the 3700 block of Military Road, Walter X. Wilson's station
wagon collided head-on with a Chevrolet sedan coming from the
opposite direction.7 It drove the Chevrolet back seventy-four feet into
a third car, turned over in the air "and continued eighty-four feet,
ending upright against a tree with the tailgate of the station wagon
against the tree and the front end protruding ... in a westerly direction
on Military Road."'
All four occupants of the Chevrolet were killed. Three were dead
on arrival at a local hospital; one died within minutes of his hospitalization.' Autopsy reports showed deaths attributable to hemorrhage,
shock, crushed chests, multiple fractures and, in the case of two victims,
a ruptured liver.'"
Walter X. Wilson was taken from the scene of the accident without apparent pulse beat." He was brought, unconscious and in critical
condition, to the George Washington University Hospital for emer3. Certified Transcript of Official Inquest of Proceedings before the Coroner in
the matter of X, pp. 25-26.
4. Id. at 9-14.
5. Id. at 42.
6, Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 4-6.
10. Id. at 45-46.
11. Id. at 11.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11 : p. 259

gency treatment, suffering from cerebral concussion, multiple lacerations and multiple fractures. After passing the critical stage Wilson
was transferred to the D.C. General Hospital for further treatment.
His physical condition did not permit him to participate in the
subsequent inquest until October 5, 1960. The Coroner's jury found
him responsible for the deaths of the four occupants of the sedan and
ordered him held for action of the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury
indicted him on four counts of manslaughter, which in the words of the
indictment, was attributable to his driving a station wagon "feloniously,
wantonly and with gross negligence.... "Y12
He was, subsequent to his indictment, transferred to the District
of Columbia jail where he was placed within the prison hospital.
The first lawyer appointed to represent him received leave to
withdraw from the case. Apparently the boy had refused to cooperate.
The same thing happened in the case of the second appointed lawyer.
A third, who turned out to be the project director, was appointed.
Walter was brought from the jail hospital into the rotunda to be
interviewed by his new counsel. The prisoner was painfully limping
about on his crutches and seated himself with some difficulty at the
table reserved for conferences with counsel.
Counsel introduced himself, and after some inconsequential preliminary discussion asked his client if he would like to tell his lawyer
about the accident. Wilson's monosyllabic response was: "No."
Counsel did not press him to engage in a discussion which he was
clearly bent upon avoiding and proceeded instead to inquire as to his
physical condition and the way in which he was being treated by the
jail authorities. He relaxed slightly in response to these questions and
provided some inconsequential information.
About this time, counsel received a telephone call from his counterpart in the United States Attorney's office informing him that the
prosecution would move for a mental examination of the boy on the
ground that he had been previously hospitalized as a psychiatric patient,
and inquiring if the defense had no objection. Counsel replied that he
would join in the motion of the government.
Neither the defense nor the prosecuting counsel knew, at that
time, that while the boy had indeed been a psychiatric patient at the
D.C. General and St. Elizabeth's Hospitals in 1956, a sharp split of
opinion had existed between the two hospitals during that period of
time as to his mental state. The D.C. General Hospital had certified
the patient as psychotic and in need of hospitalization; St. Elizabeth's
Hospital had certified him as free from mental disorder and had
recommended his discharge.
12. United States v. Wilson, Grand Jury No. X.
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The commitment for mental observation, in this case upon motion
of the government joined in by the defendant's counsel, was to St.
Elizabeth's Hospital.
III.
PRE-TRIAL TACTICS

A.

Investigation

The defense investigation of this case consisted of a study of all
available court and hospital records, interviews with friends, relatives,
and employers, further interviews with the boy, who became increasingly cooperative but did not completely shed his distrust of his counsel,
and independent psychiatric examinations of the boy undertaken with
the use of funds made available by the National Institute of Mental
Health for this purpose, as well as psychiatric examinations on court
order at the D.C. General Hospital after the conclusion of the St.
Elizabeth's examination.
In aid of this investigation counsel moved for, and obtained, a
court order directing St. Elizabeth's Hospital and the D.C. General
Hospital to furnish him with photostatic copies of all records of Walter
Wilson at the expense of the United States.
Photostatic copies of the D.C. General Hospital records of Walter's
hospitalization in 1956 were promptly and courteously forwarded to

the defense. Unfortunately St. Elizabeth's Hospital did not follow suit.
The boy's history, as gleaned from a lawyer's investigation, can
be summarized in chronological order.
The boy's parents were married in their teens. His father who
himself had had numerous brushes with the law, including a conviction
for impersonating a federal officer, was an alcoholic. His mother had
held down menial jobs throughout most of her life because she had
received no financial support from her husband. When Walter was
eight years old his mother, at that time expecting her fourth child, left
her husband and went to live with her mother. It was clear

-

even

upon cursory interviewing - that she was a person of low average
intelligence with extreme hostility toward the boy. An example of this
hostility was her statement to her son's attorney: "And be sure to tell
me when the trial is to be held because I want to be there to see
Walter convicted."
During the first year of Walter's life his mother became the
breadwinner of the family while the father remained at home to mind
the baby. Apparently, he minded the bottle rather than the baby, with
the result that the child was discovered dirty and usually unfed upon
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the mother's return at night. It was during the first year of Walter's
life that he began hitting his head against the wall for hours on end.
He would usually not stop, even though his head was bleeding. He
had also developed numerous dietary difficulties. One was his refusal
to swallow food. During the next few years he began "rocking and
rolling himself to sleep" in a rhythmic fashion which he subsequently
exhibited with dramatic results in the courtroom before startled judge
and jury. His mother reported that he had intense sleeping difficulties
beginning with the first years of his life and that by the time he had
reached adolescence he was rarely able to sleep more than four hours
a night. Early in his childhood he was witness to violent quarrels
between his mother and father.
His difficulties with authority figures, already pronounced at home,
manifested themselves in his school environment. He was sent to a
Catholic parochial school, from which he was expelled for breaking
into a church poorbox. Later he claimed that all of his subsequent
troubles were attributable to the harsh discipline imposed upon him
by the Sisters.
His experience with the public school system was no more satisfactory than with the parochial school. He would arrive at school
dirty, unkempt and fatigued from apparent lack of sleep. He did poorly
in his studies except for some drawing activity which appeared to interest him. About this time he developed the fear of people ganging
up on him.
The accused related that at school he was the object of some sort
of conspiracy. By this time he had also developed an acute fear of
the police officers of Precinct No. 8 who, he believed, were plotting to
"nail him to the door." He was involved in various acts of delinquency
and spent some time at the National Training School for Boys. At
the age of fifteen he approached a girl at school with a knife, explaining
that he had to get her before she got him.
Because of this incident, Juvenile Court sent him to the D.C.
General Hospital for psychiatric observation. This hospital kept him
for four months and a diagnostic staff conference concluded that he
was psychotic, needing hospitalization. A certification to this effect
was transmitted to the Juvenile Court, which accepted it and committed the boy to St. Elizabeth's Hospital where he was kept for a
little over three weeks. The hospital records covering that period show
little diagnostic contact beyond some psychological testing. Although
the results of the psychological testing were reported in the hospital
record as indicating a very precariously balanced individual, "desperately" in need of psychotherapy, the hospital reported him to be suffering from nothing more serious than a minor adolescent disturbance.
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After being released from the hospital, he led a generally nomadic
life until his indictment in the case under discussion. Several years
before his automobile collision he had been expelled from his home by
his mother and had since led a hand-to-mouth existence, shifting from
job to job, and frequently living in alleyways, garages and public parks.
It became apparent as a result of interviews with neighbors that
he had developed a bizarre liking for dog food. When offered a sandwich by a neighbor, ie would refuse it but steal dog food when he
thought the neighbor was not looking. His last reported job was in a
veterinary hospital, where he became addicted to dog tranquilizers. He
was at that time expressing the fear that he was under constant surveillance by the police and complaining about being shadowed by a
police spy, whom he identified. He turned out to be an innocuous, retired
old man who was in fact sunning himself outside the veterinary hospital.
The immediate events preceding the accident are not wholly clear
but this much can be claimed with some degree of reliability:
There was an increase in the intake of alcohol and dog tranquilizers.
The boy made some attempt to join the Army, to be told
that he was not eligible because of his police record.
He looked more than usually depressed.
On the day of the accident he was accosted in a bar by a
homosexual. He had just taken five dog tranquilizers and
had had approximately nine glasses of beer in addition. It
was not clear as to precisely what transpired between him and
the homosexual beyond the fact that some overture was made
to him. It was clear that he had entered the homosexual's
car and then threw the latter out. Then he proceeded to drive
the car away for the purpose, as he put it of 'splattering
myself all over the sidewalk so the police would have a mess
to clean up.'
The coroner's transcript revealed that the police had been notified
of a stolen car and had pulled abreast of one matching its description.
The auto, driven by Walter X. Wilson, had, until that time, been
proceeding at normal speed. When the police car pulled abreast of
him, Walter cast one look in its direction and stepped upon his accelerator. The car reached the speed of 80 miles per hour and weaved erratically from lane to lane until it collided with one approaching from the
opposite direction, killing four people and inflicting nearly fatal injuries
upon Walter himself.
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While hospitalized for these injuries he accumulated something
like ten sleeping pills. He consumed all of these on one night. His
stomach was pumped and the notation included in his record by an
intern that he seemed to require psychiatric supervision. Shortly before
this abortive suicidal attempt, he had informed a nurse that he had a
knife and was going to "get her" with it. The nurse summoned the
intern on duty to conduct a search of the room, but no knife was found.
B. Examination
1.

Positive Approach

At this time counsel secured the services of Dr. Leon Salzman,
of the Washington School of Psychiatry, and Dr. Edward Sachar, a
psychiatrist on the staff of the Walter Reed Hospital.
Dr. Sachar interviewed the boy for several hours while he was
still at the District jail, and diagnosed him as an aggressive and impulsive psychopath. While he was prepared to state that he regarded
his action as the product of a mental illness, he described his patient in
such uncomplimentary language that counsel preferred to forego his
testimony.
Dr. Salzman interviewed the patient more briefly at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, and stated without hesitation that he diagnosed the
defendant as suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type.
In his contacts with Dr. Salzman counsel indicated his particular
interest in the psychoanalytically-oriented development of the study of
Walter X. Wilson, which would be acceptable to a lay jury. At the
doctor's request, counsel furnished him with an excerpt from the
Carter case, to the specific effect that "the chief value of an expert's
testimony in this field . . . rests upon the material from which his
opinion is fashioned . . . ; in the explanation of the disease and its

dynamics, that is, how it arose, developed and affected the mental and
emotional process of the defendant."'"
Dr. Salzman was not unfamiliar with this approach, having previously furnished an affidavit in another case stating that a particular
series of examinations undertaken by him was "designed to provide
a view in depth of the defendant's condition, whatever its character,
at the time of the alleged crime, i.e., how it arose, developed and
affected the defendant's mental and emotional processes" and expressing
his "professional opinion that such examinations in depth .

.

. [could]

be adequately conducted only by intensive psychoanalytic techniques."' 4
13. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
14. Affidavit in support of opposition to motion for mental examination of defendant, United States v. Sweeney, Criminal Case No. 466-60 (D.D.C. 1960).
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Dr. Salzman examined the defendant on two further occasions
after his return from St. Elizabeth's Hospital to the District jail prior
to the trial.
Counsel also contacted Dr. John D. Schultz, the Medical Director
of the D.C. General Hospital, who had conducted the initial psychiatric
examination in 1956. Dr. Schultz stated that it was highly unlikely
that the boy's mental condition would have cleared up without treatment, and, upon hearing the description of the events leading to the
boy's arrest, declared it probable that the boy's illness had taken a
turn for the worse. He offered to co-operate with any doctors in charge
of the mental examination.
Acting without objection from the United States Attorney's office,
the defense thereupon moved for a court order directing Dr. John D.
Schultz to examine Walter Wilson with a view to updating his initial
findings.
Counsel for the defense also proceeded as follows:
1. He informed several of St. Elizabeth's physicians that he
had a fairly elaborate social history on the boy which he would be
happy to submit to them upon request.
2. He further informed them that Doctors Salzman and
Schultz would gladly confer with them in aid of their diagnostic
evaluation.
3. Toward the end of Walter's three month period of hospitalization at St. Elizabeth's, he requested the complete record of
Walter's hospitalization in 1956 and also the new hospital record
upon completion of their study.
The three month period of hospitalization at St. Elizabeth's had
a few days more to run. There had been no response from St. Elizabeth's to this request for data, nor had the 1956 hospitalization record
been received.
A letter was therefore sent by defense counsel to the superintendent
of St. Elizabeth's Hospital renewing the request for complete hospital
records and stressing the urgency of the situation.
Approximately five days before the trial date, Dr. Mauris Platkin
of St. Elizabeth's Hospital telephoned defendant's counsel and informed
him that the hospital had found Walter Wilson to be without mental disorder, and that copies of the hospital records would be sent "in due
course."
In a telephone conversation with Dr. Platkin two hours later,
counsel again urged the importance of his receiving the records immediately so that his experts would have an opportunity for study and
independent evaluation a few days before the trial. Dr. Platkin refused.
He declared that nothing could be done to speed up normal hospital
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procedures. Counsel responded by saying that he would be constrained
to bring contempt proceedings if the records were not delivered within
the next two days. Within two days the records were delivered to
counsel by special messenger.
When finally received the photostatic copies were incomplete. The
results of psychological testing were missing. Counsel called St. Elizabeth's to inquire about the missing report and was told that no such
test had been made. Counsel pressed the issue because his client told him
that the test had in fact been made, and two hours later he received a
15
photostatic copy of the psychological report.
The psychological report concluded that Walter Wilson was a
schizophrenic. The balance of the hospital record showed two psychiatric interviews of undetermined duration, notwithstanding the certification to the court that the defendant had been studied intensively
since his admission date.
The concluding portion of the report of the medical staff conference in the Wilson case read as follows:
During the entire examination the patient shows no abnormal
mental content, continuously expresses his undying hatred toward
others in general, and the 8th Precinct police officers, in particular.
He admits having difficulty in adjusting but attributes it mainly
to the absence of his father and his desire for a paternal figure in
the home. During hospitalization the patient has made a satisfactory adjustment, has received Equanil since being hospitalized
because of tension and anxiety.
It is the consensus of opinion of the physicians present at
the medical staff conference that this patient does not deviate sufficiently from normal to warrant a diagnosis of mental disease, and
therefore, he is being given the diagnosis of Without Mental
Disorder.
Within two days of counsel's telephone conversation with Dr.
Platkin, St. Elizabeth's Hospital transmitted its official certification to
the court that Walter Wilson was without mental disorder. The
relevant portion of the St. Elizabeth's certification read as follows:
.. . Mr. [Wilson's] case has been studied intensively since
the date of his admission to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital and he has
15. The difficulties encountered in securing medical records to which defense
counsel was legally entitled were in no way unique. Dr. Morton Birnbaum, testifying
before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, related a comparable experience which he encountered in seeking the release (through a habeas corpus proceeding)
of his indigent client from Creedmore Hospital in New York State. Dr. Birnbaum
requested the hospital records of his client in July, 1960. After three months of
delay by the hospital and the lawyers from the Attorney General's office, he was
finally allowed to inspect his client's hospital records. Hearings before the Subcommittee on ConstitutionalRights of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 298, 299 (1961).
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been examined by several qualified psychiatrists attached to the
medical staff of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital as to his mental condition. On February 15, 1961, Mr. [Walter X. Wilson] was
examined and the case reviewed in detail at a medical staff conference. We conclude, as a result of our examination and observation, that Mr. [Walter X. Wilson] is mentally competent to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to consult properly with counsel in his own defense. We find no evidence
of mental disease existing at the present time nor on or about June
8, 1960. He is not suffering from mental deficiency.
A day after that certification, and after the defendant had been
removed to the D.C. jail and the trial had continued, Dr. Platkin
contacted Dr. Salzman. A memorandum by Dr. Leon Salzman on his
conversation with Dr. Platkin on February 16, 1961, read as
follows:
4:30 p.m. Dr. Platkin called to ask if I had seen Mr. [Wilson]
and whether I had some data that might be Useful to them ...
Since they already held their staff conference I suggested that the
data could not serve the same purpose as if it were given before
the conference. He said they would change their minds if new
data were supplied. ...
When Dr. Salzman contacted counsel about this conversation,
counsel asked him directly whether he thought that Dr. Platkin
and the others at St. Elizabeth's had an open mind or whether they
were merely trying to fortify their conclusion that there was no mental
disorder by saying that they had taken every relevant medical view
into account. Since Dr. Salzman replied that he did not think the St.
Elizabeth's people had an open mind on the case, counsel instructed him
not to transmit any information to them.
2.

Negative Approach

It was clear at this stage that St. Elizabeth's Hospital would
furnish articulate and court-experienced psychiatrists to testify that the
defendant was without mental disorder. The impact of such testimony
would be overwhelming in the absence of flagrant and overtly detectable
symptoms of psychotic psychopathology, particularly in view of the
claim which would be made that the St. Elizabeth's opinion was based
upon intensive studies carried out during ninety days of observation
and examination in a hospital setting immediately preceding the trial a claim which would clearly not be matched by the available defense
psychiatrists.
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A re-examination of the defendant by the staff of the D.C. General
Hospital's Psychiatric Division would balance the scales more favorably
to the interests of the defendant.
As counsel surveyed the possible grounds for a motion for reexamination, he realized that, as a practical matter a presumption of
regularity attached to the completion of a mental examination at St.
Elizabeth's Hospital and that, barring a showing of extraordinary
cause, he could not hope for re-examination in a new hospital setting.
However, he had available to him the opinion of Dr. Schultz that
a hospital setting was needed to complete the examination of the defendant to his own professional satisfaction. Another helpful factor
developed from the photostatic copies of the hospital records forwarded
from St. Elizabeth's Hospital was the fact that there had been no
electroencephalogram. Sympathy for brain damage - if not for psychological harm - was widespread within the District Court so that failure
to check upon the possible existence of brain damage as a consequence of the brain concussion suffered by the defendant struck
counsel as very persuasive for a new mental ekamination.
In an unopposed motion for Walter's commitment to the D.C.
General Hospital Psychiatric Division, his counsel asserted as follows:
1. Defendant's counsel has been informed by Dr. John D.
Schultz, the medical director of the D.C. General Hospital who
has seen the defendant pursuant to an order of this court, that
complete reliability of the examination conducted by Dr. Schultz
of the defendant requires further observation of the defendant in
the controlled setting of the D.C. General Hospital Psychiatric
Division for a week or at least three days.
2. Defendant's counsel has been further advised by Dr.
Schultz that a letter to this court has been sent by him to this
general effect.
3. A perusal of the photostatic copies of the hospital records
of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in this case shows serious internal contradictions and a failure to accord defendant, a victim of a cerebral
concussion ...

an electroencephalogram to rule out the possibility

of brain damage.
4. There appears to have been a consistent disagreement
between the authorities of St. Elizabeth's Hospital and the D.C.
General Hospital as to the mental status of the defendant. When
examined by the D.C. General Hospital psychiatrists in 1956, the
defendant was reported to be psychotic and in need of treatment
in a hospital situation. The St. Elizabeth's authorities disagreed
with the evaluation at that time. This disagreement appears to
have been maintained as the result of the examinations conducted
in the instant case.
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5. It is submitted that the defendant is entitled to have the
full weight and benefit of the medical opinions in his favor in this
case. It is believed that this can be accorded to him only if the
request of Dr. John D. Schultz for a few days of hospitalization
at the D.C. General Hospital is complied with.
On February 27, 1961, the District Court directed the transfer of
the defendant to the D.C. General Hospital Psychiatric Division for a
period of four days. As a consequence of that transfer, the defendant
gained the additional support of the following prospective witnesses:
Dr. John D. Schultz, formerly the Chief Psychiatrist and at the time
of the trial, the Medical Director of the D.C. General Hospital, who in
1956 had diagnosed the boy as psychotic and who now brought his
findings up to date; and Dr. Bernard Levy, the Chief Psychologist of
the D.C. General Hospital.
Counsel had hoped that the transfer of the accused to the D.C.
General Hospital would result in recruitment of more than these two
witnesses. However, under the court order the commitment was for
only four days and the Chief Psychiatrist of the D.C. General Hospital
stated that she could not make any further staff members available for
the case in that brief time span. Counsel's main concern was not solely
that of gathering further testimonial support, but he was particularly
hopeful of obtaining a solid institutional front of D.C. General psychiatrists for this case. It was critical to his cause to have one government
hospital completely committed to the insanity defense since he was
opposed by another government hospital. Counsel therefore utilized
available National Institute of Mental Health funds to retain Dr. James
A. Ryan, Assistant Chief Psychiatrist at D.C. General Hospital. His
"recruitment" did not take place until the boy's transfer from the
D.C. General Hospital to the District of Columbia jail. Dr. Ryan, of
course, utilized the available D.C. General Hospital records in aid of
his diagnostic evaluation since his diagnostic contacts with the boy
were restricted to examinations conducted at the jail before and during
the trial. 6
16.
In general, the observation of a criminal made during the fatal hours
preceding the trial, reveals to a psychoanalyst a great deal about the unconscious
of the man; at times even more is revealed than in the course of many empty
weeks of a difficult analysis of a psychoneurotic. The dramatically concentrated
expressions of the man's unconscious, just before and during the trial, are more
convincing at times and much deeper than the protracted epic presentation which
the unconscious uses in free association.
ALEXANDER & STAUB, THS CRIMINAL, THE JUDCS AND THE PUBLIC 137 (1956).
As a layman I cannot, of course, make any valid generalizations concerning the
significance of Dr. Ryan's locus of examination in this case beyond setting forth the
view quoted above.
I can state that apparently more experienced psychiatrists with identical opportunities for observation in the prison setting failed to match the intuitive and intellectual understanding displayed by Dr. Ryan in this case.
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Another staff member of the D.C. General Hospital "recruited"
for the case was a psychologist who had initially tested the boy in 1956.
At about this time, two dissenters within the framework of the
St. Elizabeth's hierarchy indicated willingness to testify for the defense.
They were Dr. Brigitte Julian who believed the boy to be mentally ill
but felt that she had not had an opportunity to make a more precise
diagnosis; and Dr. Catherine Beardsley, the Chief of Training in
Psychology at St. Elizabeth's, who believed the boy to be schizophrenic.
Counsel further attempted to secure a psychiatrist who would be
willing, perhaps even without examining the defendant, to give the
court his own objective evaluation of the adequacy of the diagnostic
work-up at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, as reflected by its records. Approximately six reputable psychiatrists in the District of Columbia were
approached on this subject but all refused to consider it. One wellknown local psychiatrist expressed outright shock and amazement at
the mere thought that a lawyer would consider a maneuver by which
a psychiatric witness could be called upon to criticize the adequacy of
the diagnostic work-up at St. Elizabeth's Hospital.
Therefore, counsel contacted two New York psychiatrists. Dr.
David Abrahamsen appeared willing to conduct such a study. However,
quite inadvertently, counsel secured the services of Dr. Charles Goshen,
at that time an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at George Washington University medical school and a former administrator in the hierarchy of the American Psychiatric Association. Dr. Goshen agreed to
review the St. Elizabeth's Hospital records but insisted also upon
examining the defendant himself. His conclusion was that the accused
was clearly schizophrenic and that the records reflected an inadequate
diagnostic work-up, although such data as was available to St. Elizabeth's pointed to the presence of a schizophrenic illness.
A word or two about the defense counsel's contacts with the
defense experts in advance of trial is in order at this point.
Defense counsel saw Dr. Schultz in an interview that lasted
approximately fifteen minutes. Dr. Schultz stated without any ambiguity that he regarded the patient as schizophrenic and suggested
that the failure of St. Elizabeth's Hospital to recognize the schizophrenic process might be attributable to an excessive preoccupation
with a quest for "secondary" as distinct from "primary" symptoms of
schizophrenia. Since Walter Wilson often did not seem to manifest
the secondary symptoms, namely hallucinatory experiences, it was
possible that hurried examination or examination by inadequately
trained or inexperienced psychiatrists might fail to turn up the proper
diagnostic data. He added that psychiatrists no longer required a
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finding of secondary symptoms for a diagnosis of schizophrenia and
that the diagnosis of schizophrenia upon the basis of primary symptoms
was a subject of frequent questioning on examinations conducted by
17
the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.
Counsel saw Dr. Salzman about this case on approximately three
occasions for approximately half an hour at each meeting. Dr. Salzman furnished the defense with three written reports on his examinations. He initially described his patient as ".

.

. a rather tight-lipped,

unfriendly and anxious person, who cooperated in the interview but
'1 8
used the occasion largely to defend and justify his situation.
17. Bleuler's classic treatment of the schizophrenic process provides the following
information in this field.
We can only understand a psychically determined psychosis if we distinguish
the symptoms stemming directly from the disease process itself from those
secondary symptoms which only begin to operate when the sick psyche reacts to
some internal or external processes.
BLEULER, "DEMENTIA PRAECOX OR TH4 GROUP OP SCHIZOPHRENIA 348 (1950).
The primary symptoms are the necessary partial phenomena of a disease;
the secondary symptoms may be absent, at least potentially, or they may change
without the disease process having to change at the same time.
Almost the totality of the heretofore described symptomatology of dementia
praecox is a secondary, in a certain sense, an accidental one. Therefore the disease may remain symptomless for a long time. Whether a particular chronic
schizophrenic is able to work peacefully today or wanders about and quarrels
with everyone, whether he is neat and clean or smears himself - that is the
nature of the symptom - depends mainly on past or present events, and not
directly on the disease. Some affectively charged experience releases a hallucina-

tory agitated state. A transfer to another hospital may bring about the disappearance of the same hallucinations. Affects, which may have been entirely
absent for years at a time, may suddenly begin to function normally again Pn
certain occasions.
Id. at 349.
It is obvious that we have to consider as secondary phenomena the wellknown disturbances of memory and orientation, especially, when they appear to
be related exclusively to certain of the patient's complexes; the same holds true
for automatisms (including obsessive thoughts, etc.) which can only arise on
the basis of a certain independent activity of definite complexes.
It should also need no proof that the disturbances of the complex functions
of intelligence (deterioration and delusions), the impaired synthesis of the total
personality, the disordered strivings and efforts of the patient (irresponsibility,
abulia), the altered relations to reality (autism) are comprehensible only in connection with the above named secondary symptoms; therefore they themselves are
secondary manifestations for the most part. Also negativism is certainly a complex
secondary phenomenon.
Id. at 354.
18. Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews as Evidence: The Role of the Psychiatrist
in Court - Some Suggestions and Case Histories, 30 Gno. WASH. L. REv. 853,
862 (1962).
Dr. Salzman's findings were highlighted in his report in these words:
There is a clear atmosphere of intense hostility radiating to everyone, but
particularly the police. This is strong enough and embracing enough to justify
being called a paranoid system. He insists that the three detectives from No. 8
Precinct had it in for him and hated him and threatened frequently to kill him.
While he could not explain why they hated him, and he recognized that he was
in much trouble before meeting them, he insists that they are responsible for all
his trouble, since they provoked and tormented him. There appears to be Po
hallucination at the time, but there is a rather elaborate delusional system, with
the accompanying intense hatred that could easily be fanned into homicide.
His attitude is arrogant and contemptuous and while he appears to have no
remorse for the fatal accident, he is tense and anxious to a point of exaggerated
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Dr. Salzman did, at counsel's request, briefly confer with two of
the lay witnesses who had known the defendant. He appeared to show
no interest in the defendant's intake of dog tranquilizers and nine
glasses of beer.
Counsel suggested to Dr. Salzman that he describe the boy to the
jury as though he were talking about him to a group of mildly interested
but unsophisticated relatives concerned about how they could help.
Dr. Ryan conferred with counsel at great length, both in personal
conferences and over the telephone. He took the initiative in contacting people who had known the defendant and telephoned the Edgemoor Animal Hospital to determine the content of the tranquilizers
taken by the boy. Prior to his testimony in the courtroom, Dr. Ryan
asked to see the boy within the cell block. He conferred with counsel
frequently in the courtroom corridor about the boy's problems and his
views of the case. He appeared to be the only physician, in addition to
Dr. Charles Goshen, to manifest a definite concern over the boy's ability
to cope with the continuing stress of the trial.
In preparing to meet the psychiatric evidence of the prosecution,
which would, of course, conform with St. Elizabeth's Hospital's findings of "no mental disorder," the defense planned to show: a lack of
a psychiatric examination in depth at St. Elizabeth's, as well as a lack
of a psychoanalytically trained psychiatrist to conduct such an examination (Dr. Salzman could testify as to the requirements of an examination in depth which would provide more than a descriptive label);
and also the refusal of St. Elizabeth's to avail itself of the substantial
data concerning the defendant's life history gathered by the defense
investigation.
IV.
THE FIRST DAY OF THE TRIAL

Counsel had decided upon the following seating arrangement. He
was sitting at the head of the counsel table. Two law students assisting him in the case were seated to his right. The defendant, Walter
control which periodically breaks down, when he becomes angry, threatening
and insulting.
Id. at 862-63.
A subsequent report by Dr. Salzman provided little historical explanation of the
defendant's mental state but confirmed the impression of psychotic psychopathology.
Thus the patient was described as follows on March 5, 1961:
On this occasion he was sullen, flattened in affect and quite withdrawn. He
said No. 8 Precinct was planning to shoot him and nail him to a door. He has
had no rest from the police and if he had the opportunity he would kill them all.
He says he has also killed lots of people mentally. He trusts nobody. The
paranoid ideas are more firmly clarified on this occasion, with some suggestion
of hallucinations regarding his father. He again expresses his excessive fury
at homosexuality.
Id. at 864.
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Wilson, was the next man on the right. Sitting behind him was the
marshal who was assigned to guard him. Flanking Walter upon the
extreme right hand corner was defense counsel's associate.
The decision as to seating was prompted by the feeling that any
closer proximity between counsel and client would result in needlessly
distracting pleas for information from the latter. Counsel also felt
strongly that conferences between counsel and client at counsel table
were regarded by the average jury as evidence of rational participation
inconsistent with an insanity defense.1" Accordingly, counsel instructed
his associate and the two student assistants not to initiate any conversation with Walter but to jot down any request that he might make
during the trial and pass it on to him.
The opening note, struck by the introductory remarks of prosecuting counsel to the prospective jury members, was casual and relaxed.
Walter, who had initially been fixing his eyes on the floor, subsequently allowed himself to slump over the counsel table, burying his
head in his arms. A marshal approached counsel at that stage and
whispered that the judge wanted the defendant to sit up. Counsel so
instructed Walter. Walter followed directions but later lapsed into
his earlier position. Thereafter his position at the counsel table could be
best described in the words of a visiting psychologist:
While sitting in his straight chair, the defendant rocked
rhythmically back and forth, his entire trunk
and head moving to
20
and fro in a steady, mechanical motion.
The court permitted counsel to engage in what counsel regarded
as an adequate examination of the prospective jurors on voir dire to
determine their willingness to accept a case of psychopathology not
displaying flagrant symptoms of psychosis and even a case of nonpsychotic psychopathology as entitled to an insanity acquittal.
Counsel inquired at one point whether or not the prospective jurors
might be "adversely affected against the defendant in the evaluation
of an insanity defense if there should be evidence, as well there might
be, that the defendant . . . [had] been involved in acts of juvenile
delinquency as a child."'2

The court interrupted to inquire how counsel intended to bring
that out. Counsel replied that some of the psychiatrists would base
their final diagnostic opinion in part upon a history of protracted
maladjustment, including juvenile delinquency and that this delinquency
19. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, Crim. No. 633-53 (D.D.C. 1962).
Transcript of Proceedings, p. 2204.
20. Scheflen, The Psychologist as a Witness, 32 PZNN. BAR Ass'N Q. 329 (1961).
21. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Criminal No. X, p. 9.
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would be considered only as one of a large number of symptoms all of
which, viewed in their totality, impelled a given doctor to a particular
conclusion.

22

Counsel inquired at another point whether the prospective jurors
would be prepared to return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
even if the defendant did not resemble a wild beast.
There was silence.
Counsel responded that he gathered from the silence of the prospective jurors to this question that they would indeed "be prepared to
acquit on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to mental illness and its
connection with the crime, even though the defendant . . . [was] not

shown to be a wild beast or bereft of reason in any way."'2
The jury as finally composed consisted of a program analyst, an
unemployed clerk typist, a contact representative, three housewives, a
male room attendant, a press man, an analyst, a scientific instructor,
an economist and a retired gentleman. Negroes and whites were represented about equally on the jury.
The factual transaction was promptly stipulated by the defense
and the prosecution. The full nature of the stipulation presented by the
prosecution deserves being set forth in extenso:
It is stipulated between counsel that in the early morning
hours of June 9, 1960, I believe at about 2:40 a.m., the evidence
will establish that one Julian Thompson was drivinr his automobile in an easterly direction in the 3700 block of Military Road,
Northwest, in the District of Columbia;
That .. .in the front seat of the automobile was one Con-

stantine Poulos; in the rear left side behind the driver was one
John W. Norris;
In the middle, in the back, was Charles Williams;
And on the right side was Edward F. Johanek.
The evidence will establish that when they had arrived at that
point and traveling in an orderly manner and within the speed
limit .

.

.there was an oncoming car which had been observed

at Missouri Avenue in the District of Columbia going in a westerly
direction;
That this automobile began picking up speed when it had come
under the observation of members of the Police Department in a
squad car.
The evidence will establish that it proceeded along Military
Road, Northwest, going in a westerly direction; that it had weaved
22. Id. at 9-10.
23. Id. at 8.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/2

18

Arens: The Defense of Walter X Wilson: An Insanity Plea and a Skirmish i
WINTER

1966]

DEFENSE OF WALTER X.

WILSON

to the right and to the left; that it had arrived at speeds in excess
of 60 miles an hour.
The evidence will establish, or it is stipulated, that when it
arrived, these cars came together at 2701 Military Road, Northwest, in the District of Columbia, there was a head-on collision.
The point of impact in this collision would show that the
automobile going in a westerly direction was a couple feet south
of the center line which would put it in line of the oncoming car
that was going in the easterly direction in which the aforementioned
deceased mentioned in the indictments were traveling.
The point of impact would also show that the car going in
the easterly direction in which the deceased was, was slightly
over the center line.
The evidence further stipulated(The Court) Which car was over the center line?
(Prosecution) Both of them.
(The Court) Both of them were over the center line?
(Prosecution) Yes, sir.
(The Court) Very well.
(Prosecution) The evidence further showed that from the
point of impact the automobile in which the four deceased were,
along with this John W. Norris, was forced back approximately
78 feet.
The evidence would show that at the time of the collision
that this automobile being driven by the defendant Walter X.
Wilson going at a highly excessive rate of speed and that just
prior to the collision it had weaved to the right and to the left
excessively.
The evidence will further be, or is, that the officers on arriving at the scene did see the defendant in the striking vehicle which
had been going in the westerly direction;
That he was taken from that automobile and taken to the hospital for treatment.
The facts are and the evidence is that ...

[the four occupants

of the other vehicle were all pronounced dead on arrival at nearby
hospitals within one hour of the collision].
The evidence will show further to the effect that

. . .

the next

morning Dr. Welton, Deputy Coroner in and for the District of
Columbia, made an autopsy of the remains of the four deceased
described in the indictment, and which I have already told you
were taken from the automobile;
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That this autopsy was that the injuries that these aforementioned sustained did cause their death and that these injuries
were sustained in this automobile accident on the morning of
June 9, 1960.24

Following a conference at the bench, it was further stipulated that
the defendant had begun to speed and weave from one lane to another
only after a police car had approached him and that this approach was
justified in view of the stolen car report. In addition, the injuries
sustained by the defendant, as indicated by certain hospital records,
were agreed upon.
In his opening statement to the jury, defense counsel declared:
[T]here were warning signs . . . of mental illness [in the

case of Walter X. Wilson].
nored....

These warning signs were ig-

In 1956, the boy, after numerous episodes of bizarre, acute,
and dramatic maladjustment, was sent to the D.C. General Hospital Psychiatric Division, where he spent four months and received the intensive .

.

. attention of the doctors, headed by Dr.

John D. Schultz, who will testify before you.
And it was at that time, in 1956, when the boy was only
fifteen . . . that Dr. Schultz reported . . . that the boy was . . .
psychotic . . . and that society's interest demanded that he be

confined in a hospital where treatment was available, and where
he could be cured of his illness....
Dr. Schultz's warning fell on deaf ears.
The boy was released from St. Elizabeth's ....

25

Dr. Schultz turned out to be the first witness for the defense and
was called immediately following a recess."6 His testimony was couched
essentially in conclusory terms and depended for its persuasiveness
essentially upon his authoritative and self-assured air and presentation.
Dr. Schultz observed that he had diagnosed the defendant as
schizophrenic in 1956 and that his present opinion was substantially
the same. It was his further opinion that the defendant's crimes, if
any, were the products of his mental illness.
24. Id. at 17-23.
25. Id. at 26-28.
26. Once the stipulation had been made in open court, the government's case as
to the facts of the manslaughter charge was established. It then became incumbent
on the defense to introduce "some evidence" of mental disorder in the accused, which
the government in turn had to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt if it were to secure

a guilty verdict. Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1951). This
explains the topsy-turvy sequence of witnesses in this case, with the defense calling the
first witness and the prosecution following with its evidence as to the accused's sanity.
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As concluded by Dr. Schultz, the defendant was "of unsound
mind."

'27

Dr. Schultz had difficulty recalling aspects of the case at certain
times and struggled with his recollection of details. 2 This deficiency
became particularly apparent upon redirect examination. The following
is illustrative:
By the Defense:
Q. Aside from the diagnosis of any other doctor, Dr. Schultz,
is there anything within the hospital record during the period indicated, June to September, 1960, suggestive of mental disturbance? And I refer to what the defendant is reported to have done,
rather than anything that may have been said about his condition
on psychiatric study.
A. I can't answer that. I would have to restudy it. I don't
recall that there is and I don't recall that there is not.
Q. Dr. Schultz, is it not a fact that the hospital record between
June and September, 1960, reflects an attempted suicide by the
defendant [Walter X. Wilson] ?
A. There is a note to that effect in the record; that is correct.
Recross Examination
By the Prosecution:
Q. Does that have some significance for you, Doctor?
A. No, sir.
Redirect Examination
By the Defense:
Q. Dr. Schultz, you do not consider suicidal attempts to be
evidence of mental health, do you sir?
(Prosecution) I object to that - this suicidal attempt, in
this case.
(Defense) Very well, in this case.
(The Witness) Evidence of emotional disturbance, yes, but
this can occur in any diagnostic setting. That is why I said it had
no special diagnostic significance.29
Upon the resumption of the trial that afternoon following a
luncheon recess, Dr. Salzman took the stand. Counsel for the defense
27. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Criminal No. X, pp.

32-66.
28. Id. at 67-91.

29. Id. at 95-96.
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established his qualifications, including a teaching position at St. Elizabeth's Hospital which allowed him to assert that the staff members of
the John Howard Pavilion were generally present or former students
of his "because they come through ... [his] seminar."8 0

A lack of rapport between Dr. Salzman and counsel appeared
evident almost immediately. The following colloquy is illustrative:
Q. Do you have an opinion, Dr. Salzman to a reasonable
medical certainty, as to whether the accident described in the
indictment, was a product of the mental illness which you have
diagnosed?
A. It so seems to me.
Q. Do you have an opinion to a reasonable medical certainty?
A. I have. I think that the accident was due to - was caused
by the illness under which Mr. [Wilson] was at that time involved in. 81
Dr. Salzman's testimony was obviously given in terms less conclusory than those of Dr. Schultz. However, it became clear, as Dr.
Salzman talked, that his knowledge of the defendant's recent past was
haphazard and that his presentation often lacked organization and
simplicity. His presentation, moreover, appeared marred both by his
haste and his occasional staccato quality.
One of the first questions defense counsel put to him was as follows:
Dr. Salzman, would you tell the court and jury about the
mental illness of the defendant, how it arose, developed, and affected
his mental and emotional processes, specifically on June 9, 1960?
The response he received was this:
Well, I could perhaps start with June 9th and then try to
build up to this as best I can, and as briefly as I can:
I believe that on June 9th, the situation which arose was the
end result of a series of both delusional and what we call paranoid,
meaning overwhelmingly frightened, attitudes that Mr. [Wilson]
was undergoing, and when he was stopped and spoken to by one
of the patrolmen, he got extremely frightened and sped off.
Now, the reason I say this is because there is a great deal of
data with regard to his having had an abnormal pathological, delusional fear of policemen; he has been engaged in this particular
kind of delusion for at least three years that I know, or maybe
more, where he feels and felt that the policemen, particularly in
No. 8 Precinct, were against him, were engaged in some plot to
destroy him, to pin him up against the wall, as he puts it-. 2
30. Id. at 98.
31. Id. at 100-01.

32. Id. at 101 (Emphasis supplied).
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The following interplay between court, counsel and witness then
occurred:
(The Court) Are you getting all this from him?
(The Witness) Yes. Not all of it, most of this from him,
some from a friend, a Mr. Rocca, who was a neighbor, information from his mother with regard to the expression of these ideas,
and some from the social worker report, in which there is an
abnormal exaggerated preoccupation, intense preoccupation with
this whole problem of being the subject of abuse by policemen.
By the Defense:
Q. Was there any real basis to this fear, Dr. Salzman?
A. Well, apparently not, because I was told by Mr. Rocca and
by some of the No. 8 Precinct, 3 that actually some of them liked
him; and I have raised this question on each interview with the
prisoner, Mr. [Wilson], and cannot shake this notion at all. The
fact is that there was not a clearcut antagonism towards him; that
there were some people at No. 8 who actually thought he was a
fairly nice kid, as they put it.
So far as I can see, and as far as one can understand, there
was no reasonable basis for these extreme feelings.
Q. Now, would you tell the court and the jury, Dr. Salzman,
howA. Incidentally, I only wanted to mention one other incident
which brought this out, and I did not mention:
That when he worked at the veterinarian's - and this was
reported by the people on the staff there - he would see policemen
across the street, people who were dressed in plainclothes, who he
said were policemen, who he thought were watching him, were
scrutinizing him, and while working at the veterinarian's he felt
that his activities were watched. [A]nd shortly before June 9th he
put his suits in various tailor's establishments, a rather peculiar
business because he assumed that he was being trailed and he
wanted to make sure that all his suits were not picked up, so he
had his suits cleaned at three different establishments, and I never
could understand why, except that, as he explains it, it was a way
of fooling the cops who were trailing him.
It just came to my mind.
Q. Could you explain to the court and the jury, Dr. Salzman,
how these abnormal fears and fantasies originated?
33. Dr. Salzman had at no time talked to any member at the No. 8 Precinct as
he subsequently admitted. He interpreted his testimony as signifying only that he
had been informed about the views of the No. 8 Precinct.
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A. Well, [to] the best of our knowledge, on the information
that I have, most concerned itself with the early years of his life.
I could only give you a sketch of the later years. But in the early
years there was an extremely disrupted family situation.
There was an extreme amount of neglect in the home. The
mother worked, the father presumably took care of the child.
He was a heavy drinker, and there was a great deal of evidence that he rarely changed or even fed the child. This was translated into a great many pathological items of behavior then; headbanging, bed-rocking, sleepless activities, dietary problems, and so
forth, and particularly in the first yearQ. Dr. Salzman, if I may interrupt, would you describe to the
court and the jury just what took place during that one year in
more detail? You refer to head-banging and bed-rocking. What
do you mean by these particular remarks and what is their significance in the first year of a child's development?
A. Well, the first year of the child's development is characterized by a total dependence upon the parents. The infant cannot
take care of its needs in any regard and requires the good will of
the parents.
When this is lacking, or if it is indifferent or even deliberately
neglectful, you get various responses in the child towards this:
Some children may not survive it but when they do they
develop a variety of symptoms which are indicative of abnormal
situations. One of them is the head-banging in which the infant the reasons why the infant does it are not very clear, but they are
a response to a distressful situation inside - bangs its head
against the side of the crib, floor, wherever it is, rather extensive
banging, so that you get black and blue marks.
There are exaggerated movements - physical movements in what is known as rocking, in which the infant will bounce back
and forth in its crib. It's an expression of excited neurological
symptomatology. There are some dietary problems which are
rather common and understandable, and the bed-wetting, which
was not present then but which came later, which extended to the
eighth year, was another sort of auxiliary fact about the extreme
situation that this infant was undergoing.3 4
When asked to describe "the personality of this boy," Dr. Salzman
replied:
I see this young man as somebody who is extremely sullen,
overwhelmed with anger and resentments, a person who presents
a picture of a frightened sort of animal-like individual who feels
34. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Criminal No. X,
pp. 101-05.
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[the] pressure of an unfriendly world, with antagonisms all around
him, with inability to trust anybody, to feel close, and to feel that
anyone is safe to be with, and underneath this, interestingly enough,
when you do get to know him, in some ways he is rather a
warm boy.
This does not seem contradictory if you get to know him a
little better, of a frightened little boy, rather than someone who
is angry as he appears on the surface.
Now, the picture of him essentially is someone who is being
hounded, tormented, trailed and constantly endangered .... 35
The direct examination of Dr. Salzman was concluded by asking
whether the St. Elizabeth's Hospital records which he had studied reflected "an attempt at psychodynamic investigation.
His answer was: "No, not the records."
Defense counsel was forced to inquire: "What does?"
Dr. Salzman replied: "The records do not." 6
Since it seemed clear that the case of the defendant would be
gravely damaged by the testimony of the St. Elizabeth's Hospital physicians representing the official view of that hospital and one based
upon essentially descriptive psychiatric thinking, the defendant's counsel
attempted to stress the theme of a lack of evidence of psychodynamic
examination at St. Elizabeth's upon redirect by asking Dr. Salzman
if it were ". . . possible for a psychiatrist to determine the origin of the
illness, how it arose, developed, and affected the mental and emotional
processes of the defendant, without significant training in psychoanalysis ?" He received this answer from Dr. Salzman:
Well, that's a different question and I think there we have
a matter of definition because the area is confused. The training
of psychiatrists today includes such a background in what we call
psychoanalytic techniques and methodology [so] that it is hard to
separate what is psychiatric and what is psychoanalytic, and I am
not sure that that is particularly profitable.
What is significant is that the skill in exploration that comes
from these techniques in doing psychodynamic investigations, are
what we call psychoanalytic. That is where they came from.
Counsel asked the witness if he knew of a single fully-qualified
psychoanalyst on the staff of the John Howard Pavilion of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, to which Dr. Salzman replied that he did not know the
35. Id. at 110-11.
36. Id. at 121. I have added the emphasis as the word records was stressed by
the witness in his enunciation.
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entire staff. Counsel then asked him if the records of St. Elizabeth's
reflected an attempt at psychoanalytic investigation. Before the witness
could reply, the court stated: "I don't think you have to have a psychoanalytic investigation to determine a man's sanity and I think the
Doctor agrees with that."38 7 This, in essence, was Dr. Salzman's position.
The concluding part of Dr. Salzman's testimony seriously undermined the basic position of the defense - which was, that no adequate
psychodynamic investigation had taken place at St. Elizabeth's Hospital.
The need for sur-rebuttal witnesses at the end of the prosecution's case
seemed imperative.
V.
THE SECOND DAY OF THE TRIAL

Dr. James A. Ryan was the first expert witness for the defense
upon the resumption of the trial. He was the youngest of the defense
doctors; he had not yet been certified as a specialist by the American
Board of Psychiatry and Neurology; nor had he, unlike the two witnesses who preceded him, completed his psychoanalytic training at the
time of his testimony. And yet -

one does not hesitate to say -

he

was the most effective psychiatric witness to testify for the defendant.
The doctor had examined the defendant on two separate occasions
prior to the trial. Significantly, he took the initiative in seeking out
the defendant again on the day of his testimony and interviewing him
briefly that morning.

8

8

He had, of course, studied the records which counsel had made
available to him and had "talked with ... [the defendant's] mother on
the telephone for a period of about a half an hour .

.

. [and] with one

of his neighbors, Mr. Rocca, for a period of about five minutes." 3 9
His handling of legally critical questions was, unlike that of the
preceding witnesses, articulate, grammatical and direct. The transcript
speaks for itself:
Q. Based upon your examination
Doctor Ryan, do you have an opinion
certainty as to whether the defendant,
suffering from a mental disease on June

and study of this case,
to a reasonable medical
Walter X. Wilson, was
9, 1960?

A. Yes, I do.
Q. And would you tell the court and jury what that opinion
is, please?
37. Id. at 143-45.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Ibid.
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A. In my opinion he was then suffering from a major mental
disease, one which profoundly affected his judgment and his ability
to moderate and guide his own behavior.

Q. Doctor Ryan, did you also form an opinion to a reasonable medical certainty as to whether the events charged in the indictment were the products of the mental illness in question?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what is your opinion, sir?
A. In my opinion the events prior to [those with] which
Mr. [Wilson] has been charged were the direct product of a major
mental illness.
Q. And what is the name of the major mental illness, Dr.
Ryan?
A. At the time of the crimes with which he is charged, I
believe he was suffering from an acute episode of paranoid schizophrenia. Perhaps a name that would designate it a little more
accurately would be a schizophrenic panic reaction. 0
At all times, moreover, Dr. Ryan maintained easy rapport with
the courtroom audience, sensing the points most likely to prove of interest to his lay listeners and setting them forth with appropriate clarity
in his portraiture of his patient.
Asked as to how long the basic schizophrenic process had existed
within the patient, Dr. Ryan provided the following account, interrupted by an occasional question:
A. I believe that it has existed for at least five years going
back to the time of his prior admission to the D.C. General Hospital, and I believe that it is still existing even at the present time.
Q. Would you tell us something about that disease process
and how it manifests itself ?
A. This is describing the more chronic disease condition
which I found which I would call a chronic state of paranoid
schizophrenia in distinction from the condition at the time of the
crime, acute panic reaction: the more chronic illness was manifested to me at the time of my examination by basically two findings; one was that there was evidence of delusions of persecution.
These involved largely people in the police department who were,
he felt, out to get him.
I might say that in arriving at a conclusion that he had such
delusions, I had to make a distinction, which we often have to
make, between a person who would be a 'cop hater' - we many
40. Id. at 156-57.
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times have to examine a patient who has a rather fixed resentment
about the police - but because of the very extensive nature of
Mr. [Wilson's] fears about the police, I have concluded that he has
delusions of persecution even at the present time.
If I might, while discussing the presence of delusions of persecution, there were other evidences of this type of delusion. For
example, in my examination of Mr. [Wilson] on Friday, after the
trial had been on for one day, he spontaneously began the interview by saying that he was going to get a certain individual, he
was going to strangle him, if this individual came in court again
he might jump up and try to choke him.
I asked him to tell me more about this, and he said it was
that person, he used an epithet, called him an 'S.O.B.,' that man
was against him; and I asked him who the man was, and he said
it was a man - at this point he explained that they had asked
before picking the jury if any of the jury had any reason of
prejudice, and reason not to be on the jury, and that this one
person had said yes, he did have a reason not to be on the jury
and that this man was prejudiced against him, and if he could get
hold of this one individual who admitted in court he was prejudiced, he would kill him.
By way of pointing up how there is a delusion involved here,
I then explained to him that this is a procedure which is designed
to protect him. Persons who might have any reasons to be against
him are screened out in this way at court, and that this person
apparently had some reason not to be on the jury and that actually
then this person was someone who was acting in his best interests.
At this point he said, 'Well, I still want to get him, but it's
those other people who are on the jury. He is the only one who
admitted it. The others are all there to get me, and they were put
there by the Number 8 Police Department.'
This actually came out a little later about the Number 8 Police
Department, so his feeling was that the whole jury was rigged
and this one individual who he wanted to kill was another person
who was in a plot against him, so in this way his idea about
getting back at a person who seemed to be acting in his best interests becomes logical in a morbid way; becomes logical because
he felt that this person was just part of a whole plot of people
to hurt him.
Q. Is it possible, Doctor Ryan, that these unusual statements
on the part of the defendant may be the product of an inherently
bad person rather than a sick person?
A. I would say that this type of thinking is an indication of
a profound mental disorder.41
41. Id. at 157-60.
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Nor did Dr. Ryan, unlike the doctors who preceded
of the appearance of his patient at the counsel table as
narrative account of the dynamics of his patient's mental
as to whether there were any "overt symptoms which...
noticeable about the defendant and which ...

him, lose sight
he provided a
illness. Asked
[were] easily

[exemplified] his illness

at this time," Dr. Ryan replied as follows:
Yes, there are.
As a matter of fact, at this time - even at the present time
I believe the defendant is exhibiting a symptom of rocking which
I had occasion to observe in the jail. This is not in itself a symptom
of psychosis,
but it is a symptom which has a long past history in
42
his case.
As the witness made these remarks, judge and jury turned in the
direction of Walter Wilson, who was rocking back and forth in his
chair without interruption. Only after the judge and the jury had had
an adequate opportunity to absorb this sight did Dr. Ryan resume his
testimony. Dr. Ryan did not appear to be in any way striving for any
dramatic effect. Walter's rocking back and forth in his chair at that
specific moment was in fact all-absorbing both to the doctor, and, at
that stage, to the judge and jury.
As Dr. Ryan went on with his testimony, he explained:
Actually, he has a past history of head banging. Up until he
was about two years old he would bang his head against the side
of the crib. This type of symptom, when it goes on for some period
of time, in itself usually indicates a profound emotional turmoil
on the part of a young child.
Nowadays we see this particular symptom as a reason for
a psychiatric referral even in a year old youngster.
Following the period in which he had the symptom of head
banging he developed a symptom of rolling or rocking which is
another very profound indication of emotional unrest in a youngster. He developed this symptom at age three and it has continued
on up until the present time.
Now, this is a symptom in which a person adopts a rocking
motion. Basically, they may use it at bedtime; most commonly
they use it at bedtime to get to sleep at night. Psychologically we
believe that it is based on the rocking motion of a cradle. There
is something in the general rocking motion that may help a severely
disturbed person to get to sleep.
Now, during the course of my examination at the jail this
symptom became a sign, that is, it became something objective
42. Id. at 160.
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which I was able to observe, and it came on about midway through
my first interview with Mr. [Wilson] at a time when we were
talking about his mother, when he spontaneously began to rock
back and forth.
I suggested that perhaps this sign may be present right now.
I would say that this is just a little bit of what I actually observed
in the way of rocking at jail. At the jail the rocking was quite
profound, involved his whole body, actually, rocking back and
forth without an apparent awareness on his part that he was
rocking. It continued for perhaps twenty minutes or so while we
were talking about matters that he was then distressed about.
Q. Can you tell us about any of the other symptoms of
his illness ?
A. Yes.
There was one other indication, major indication, of illness.
There is one other classical manifestation of this disease
which we speak of as flatness, or flattening of the mood.
Now, flattening of the mood is something which a psychiatrist
is specially trained to observe. In order to explain how I saw
this symptom I would have to explain what we mean by the mood.
You know normally people show variations in their mood.
You know that you may meet a person and say that person is a
very warm individual, or you may speak of someone as being very
spontaneous or full of life or vibrant personality. These are
laymen's comments on the mood of another person. Similarly,
you might meet an individual and say, 'Well, that person is a cold
fish, he hardly cracked a smile all the time I was with him.' These
both are comments on a person's mood.
Now, the normal variations in mood can be very subtle and a
psychiatrist is specially trained to see subtle variations in the mood.
The mood actually reflects a person's interest in his surroundings, in response to things that are happening in - for example,
in a discussion with a doctor a patient's mood normally varies
up and down, may become a little angry, or may become warm
hearted, may feel good, may show pleasure in the course of a
discussion with the doctor, and these are normal mood variations.
Now, in Mr. [Wilson's] case throughout the first twenty
minutes in which I saw him I would say that he showed a flattening of the mood, that is, he was talking about himself, he was
responding to questions, but with no variation whatsoever in
his mood. A little bit of variation began to come in after he
developed the rocking motion. Then after that there was an indication of very hostile mood. and then, finally, at the close of my
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talk with him there was a little evidence of warmth, a reaching
out to me for some kind of interest in him. This only came at the
end of an hour and fifteen minute discussion with him. So that
at the start there was a sustained period in which he displayed
flattening of the mood, and flattening of the mood does indicate
a person who has it has withdrawn his interests from his surroundings and pulled into himself in a very serious way, something which is only seen in the presence of a major mental illness
such as schizophrenia." 3
We have evidence that the illness existed five years ago, I
would say very clear evidence in the records of D.C. General Hospital in reports of doctors who at that time found flatness of affect.
Two of my colleagues on the staff, Doctor Schultz and Doctor
Costa, at that time made the same observation about the mood
which I had occasion to make last week. Also the thinking disorder is indicated in the record at that time so that it is an illness
that was present as far back as five years ago.
Now, how an illness like this actually gets started is a matter
of . . . [dispute].

For example, there are schools of psychiatry

that would say this illness has a chemical origin, and there are
other schools of psychiatry that say no, it has a psychological
origin. I believe that the predominant psychiatric theory about an
illness like this would say that there are undoubtedly psychological
factors even though there may be chemical influences.
Now, the kind of psychological factors that would appear to
be involved in the origin of this illness were obtained in the history
which I got from Mrs. [Wilson]. She related that ...

very early

in his life it was necessary for her to turn her attention from her
son to work, that even before he was born she was having serious
trouble with her husband, that her husband had been an alcoholic
for a number of years, that he beat her up, and in characteristic
fashion of a person who would have a serious drinking problem
her husband had extra trouble in tolerating her pregnancy with
[Walter]. So that she herself had a considerable background of
reasons to have worry about having her son in the first place,
worrying about giving birth to him.
And then shortly after birth she continued to have trouble
by way of fights with her husband. He actually moved out, I
believe, shortly after the time of [Walter's] birth, and he came and
went for a period of several years. Now, his coming and going
again was marked at all time by episodes of violence between Mr.
and Mrs. [Wilson].
This kind of violence can't exist in the life of a youngster
without raising the possibility of having a serious illness. Now,
I am not saying that every youngster who is exposed to violence
has a serious illness. Many of them have ways of compensating
43. Id. at 160-63.
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so that the illness does not develop, but when we see this history
and the coming and going, the insecurity created by absence of the
father from the home, the insecurity created by violence which
the youngster experiences, then we see at least a strong, early sort
of fertilizing process that may make a way for major mental illness.
Now, I have already touched on the indications of serious
emotional turmoil early in life; the symptom of head banging
which existed for, I believe, about a year and a half, just roughly
age two to three and a half, is a very serious symptom, one for
which we would always at this time advise psychiatric evaluation, again, not necessarily an indication that schizophrenia is
then present, but an indication of serious emotional turmoil.
The subsequent symptoms of rocking before going to bed at
night is a very profound pathological sign, and then there is further
history of this child being different. Often we believe the origins
of the illness do go well back into childhood, and they are described by parents as a difficult child, one that didn't get along
with other children, one that kept to himself more.44
There is indication that the illness may have been present in
the period ... when [Walter] was about eight and had acquired a

collection of knives and had threatened to use one of the knives
on his father if his father ever came back. This would suggest,
even at that time, a very deep feeling of insecurity and a tendency
to have homicidal impulses, a youngster who would carry a knife
at that age and speak of using a knife on his father, so that it is
difficult to say when the illness actually arose. It appears to have
been present five years ago. There are indications that there was
a severe degree of emotional unrest going back to age one and
a half or two.
Q. Now, Doctor Ryan, do you have an opinion as to the
mental and emotional processes of the defendant, [Walter X.
Wilson], on June 9, 1960, and the effect of those mental and emotional processes upon the events of that day?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And would you give us the benefit of your opinion, please?
A. I believe that on that day Mr. [Wilson], who was then
chronically ill, [with the] same illness I have described, suffered
a worsening of his illness. As far as I can see there were two
things involved, two factors involved in the worsening of his illness.
For one thing, from a psychological point of view, there had
been a worsening because he had hoped to get into the service
and he had talked with Mr. Rocca, his neighbor, about his dis44. The words in the official trial transcript are "different child." It is obvious

that this is one of the stenographical or typographical errors which marks many a page
of an average transcript. I have taken the liberty of recapturing what I believe to
be the true meaning by substituting the obvious.
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appointments in actually trying to get into the service, but two
other factors appeared to bring on an acute worsening on the
evening of June 9.
One of these factors was that Mr. [Wilson] had taken five
tranquilizing pills at approximately nine o'clock in the evening
and the other one was that about two hours after that(The Court) How do you know?
(The Witness) This is the history, Your Honor. I don't
know for a certainty.
(The Court) Who told you that?
(The Witness) This is history that I obtained from Mr.
[Wilson].
(The Court) He told you that he took five tranquilizing pills?
(The Witness) Yes, Your Honor.
(The Court) What kind?
(The Witness) These tranquilizing pills were dog tranquilizers which he said he obtained from - I believe it is the Edgemoor Animal Hospital where he had been employed some months
before.
(The Court) They give tranquilizers to dogs?
(The Witness) Yes, Your Honor, they do.
(The
quilizers?
(The
about four

Court) Even a dog is nervous and has to have tranWhat do they give them?
Witness) This particular tranquilizer is made up of
different ingredients.

(The Court) Does it have a name?
(The Witness) I don't know the trade name, Your Honor.
(The Court) Well, is it similar to Equanil, Miltown, or Thorazine, or something like that?
(The Witness) Yes, it is similar to them. It has actually the
same ingredients used in human tranquilizers. This one has some
Phenobarbital in it and it has one of the newer tranquilizers
Mephenesin in it, and I believe it has Bromide in it as well. I am
not sure what the fourth ingredient is.
(The Court) He took five of these on the date in question at
about what time?
(The Witness) At about nine o'clock, Your Honor.
(The Court) How strong are these?
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(The Witness) This would be difficult to actually know because it is not a preparation used in regular medical practice,
but from the amount of ingredients that were present, the recognizable ingredients that are in the tranquilizers, I would say five
of them plus a later history of drinking nine beers 45
would create a
good possibility for a toxic reaction, a drug state.
Dr. Ryan then proceeded to discuss another symptom of the defendant's illness.
One element in his illness has been an enormous fear of being
attacked or being hurt, and mixed together with the fear of being
attacked is a fear of being approached by another man for a what we would call a homosexual situation. These are two fears,
and two separate fears which are very strong in the background
of the patient. They would be so great that at the time of my
last interview the patient brought out that he couldn't stand
having a marshal sit behind him; he wondered, 'why can't that
man sit in front of me where I can see him.' So this is a burden
that he carries with him, I would say, at all times, his fear of
another man attacking him; and then side by side with that is
fear of another man approaching him and trying to have some
form of sexual play with him.
Now, these two fears are ...

present. I have to point them

up because they are so vital to the understanding [of] the disturbed state in which I felt he entered on this evening.
These fears are so great that he has frequent dreams of men
chasing him, he has had dreams of men approaching him, has
dreams in which he murders men who approach him, he has had
dreams in which his father is one of the men who approaches him
and tries to engage him in activity, and sometimes the outcome of
the dreams is that he falls down a cliff or falls over a steep building.
These dreams have been regularly present for a very long time.46
Both the witness and defense counsel were side-tracked at this
particular stage from pursuing the theme of the panic reaction brought
about by the approach of a homosexual to the defendant as a result
of a skeptical and digressive series of judicial questions as to the significance of dream interpretation in psychiatric diagnosis. However, Dr.
Ryan picked up the threads of his testimony on direct examination
with these remarks:
I might mention one further observation about the fear which
would go into this, which would be another element, in my mind,
regarding his fear of attack. [I]t came out in my second interview on Friday, something which I suspected after my first inter45. Transcript
pp. 166-72.

of

Proceedings,

United States v. Wilson,

Criminal No.

X,

46. Id. at 174-76.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/2

34

Arens: The Defense of Walter X Wilson: An Insanity Plea and a Skirmish i
WINTER

19661

DEFENSE OF WALTER X.

WILSON

view, this patient has been having auditory hallucinations of a
threatening nature. He has been hearing voices which tell him
that someone is going to attack him, also voices which call him
bad names. He has been hearing these for about five years.
I say that I suspected it after my first interview because I might say, there is an art to learning that a patient has this
degree of illness, that they have a hallucination, and there is a
proper time for bringing the question in. Many patients are
ashamed of the fact that they hear voices that threaten them and
they won't tell you.
In my first examination when it came to a point where I did
ask a question about hearing voices the patient dodged the question, he didn't answer it, but he went off and began to talk about
dreams which he had had.
This is something that often happens in a patient who has
hallucinations. A patient who is not having hallucinations will
answer the question very quickly and very directly that they are
not hearing voices.
In the second interview with him at a point later in the interview he finally confessed to me, as it were, that he had been hearing
voices in the evening, which is a characteristic time for hearing
them, at the end of the day just before going to bed or while in
bed when it was quiet, when his interest from his surroundings
was fully withdrawn, that he had been hearing voices, and he felt
very ashamed about hearing them, he felt bad because the voices
called him very bad names, and also 47
he had always been worried
because these voices threatened him.

Dr. Ryan then added that Walter Wilson needed treatment in
a maximum security ward of a mental hospital for a long period of time
and that at the present time he was both homicidal and suicidal.
Cross-examination largely confirmed the strength of Dr. Ryan's
direct testimony. As a matter of fact it actually enhanced it. The
following are some of Dr. Ryan's answers to questioning upon crossexamination:
Q. This stress that you spoke of in direct examination, wasn't
that in reference to the police car coming up on the defendant, and
things of that sort?
A. In my analysis of the case I see actually two stresses; the
initial stress would have to do with the feeling on the defendant's
part that he had - that he was being approached by another man
for an immoral act.4
47. Id. at 178-79.
48. Id. at 191.
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Q. The acute reaction you speak of is a reaction to the homosexual advance, be it real or imaginary?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. How is that associated with the police coming upon
the scene ?
A. Again, behind this fear is a fear of attack, and there is
evidence that he has had a long standing fear of attack, that I
would believe to be a delusional fear of attack from police.
Q. How about the delusional fear of attacks from homosexuals ?
A. Yes, this has also been present.
Q. But actually if there was an approach by a homosexual
it would not have been a delusion.
A. No. Again the approach may not have been a delusion,
but the persistent feeling that people around him were trying to
engage him in immoral acts, this is the delusion; this is present still.
Q. That is as regards these other people, but we are saying
that the acute reaction was this one homosexual approaching him
on that night; isn't that correct?
A. Yes, in this particular instance.
Q. And he had some fear of that individual homosexual;
right ?
A. Well, again, whether he had a real fear of the individual
or whether he had a misperceived fear of the individual, he still
had a chronic delusion that men would try to engage him in homosexual behavior.

Q. Well, the chronic delusion, did that exist on June 8?
A. Yes, I would say that it did.
Q. How did this condition on June 8 vary from that on
June 9?
A. I would say that the delusion has been present for many
years and is still present. 9
Fortunately, at this point, the line of cross-examination pursued
by prosecuting counsel picked up the theme of the panic reaction brought
about by the approach of the homosexual to the defendant on the day
of the accident and permitted Dr. Ryan to put it in clear perspective
in his testimony.
49. Id. at 200-01.
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Q. How about the acute reaction; was there an acute reaction
on June 8?
A. On the day of the-

Q. The day before.
A. The day before.
Again, the predisposition to an acute reaction was undoubtedly
there, but he needed something to set it off.
Q. What set it off on June 9?
A. Again, I would say that it was either a real approach or
it was the mere circumstance of being in the car along with another man.
Q. You know that he was in the car with another man?
A. Again, this is a history as I have obtained it from Mr.
[Wilson].
Q. Did you determine who the owner of the car was on that
particular night ?
A. No, I don't know the owner's identity.
Q. And what about the - immediately after this homosexual
experience, be it real or imaginary, being an offer of actual fulfillment of the act, what was the defendant's reaction?
A. The immediate reaction is one of fear followed by a breakthrough of angry impulse which he described as 'seeing red,' and
'going to pieces,' followed by a panic and a need to get away.
Q. How did he manifest that panic and that fear to get away;
what did he do?
A. Then he began to kick and thrash about in the car, punch
at the other man who was in the car, finally kick him out of the
car. He said at first, 'Maybe I drove over him, maybe I didn't;
I had to get away.'
Q. And then did he drive away?
A. He then drove away.
Q. And then what happened?
A. After that, my impression is that his recollections are
somewhat blurred, but there did come a time when he saw a flashing red light.
Q. What happened then?
A. Then there was further panic - further, I would say an
increasing state of panic at the thought that the police were after
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him, again
based on a long standing fear of what police might do
0
to him.
On redirect examination the defense counsel concluded his questioning of the witness by inquiring as to whether he believed Walter
Wilson to be subject to commitment to a mental hospital even if he
were to assume that no crime had been committed by him in this case.
There was immediate objection by the government.
The emerging judicial attitude toward the question of Walter's
mental health was then promptly portrayed in these responses:
(The Court) Overruled.
He has schizophrenia, hasn't he?
(The Witness) Yes, Your Honor.
Not every patient who has schizophrenia is committed to a
mental institution. I would have to become more specific, if I may(The Court) What type is that?
(The Witness) Right at the present time it is paranoid
schizophrenia.
(The Court) You say that if you are a paranoid schizophrenic you shouldn't be committed?
(The Witness) No. We do recognize such a thing as a
chronic paranoid schizophrenic who, we may feel, is not dangerous to other people.
(The Court) I am not talking about other people; I am talking about this person. You said he was dangerous, didn't you?
(The Witness) Yes, Your Honor.
(The Court) The question now is, even if he hadn't committed this crime should he be committed to a mental hospital.
(The Witness) Yes, Your Honor. Based on my present
examination I would say he should be committed to a mental
institution.5
On recross-examination, prosecuting counsel sought to inquire of
Dr. Ryan as to what "stage" the defendant's illness had progressed.
Once again the court intervened, clearly showing his belief in the
defendant's mental illness. "You say that he has had it for five years...
''
That wouldn't be an early stage, would it ? 52
50. Id. at 201-03.
51. Id. at 209-10.

52. Id. at 211.
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Dr. Ryan's testimony has been characterized by an informed
observer who had studied it in transcript form as "psychiatric teaching
at its best."
VI.
THE THIRD DAY OF THE TRIAL

Defense counsel assumed at this time that the jury had perhaps
been deluged up to its capacity with psychiatric testimony and decided
upon a change of pace.
Consequently, the next two witnesses were laymen who had known
the defendant. The first was the night attendant at the Edgemoor
Animal Hospital, at which the defendant had worked, who testified
about Walter's suspicion and fear of being watched by the police.
The second lay witness testifying for the defendant was the manager of a barbershop who had lived next door to the defendant until
the latter was thrown out by his mother. Approximately three months
prior to the accident, this witness had made a point of befriending the
53
defendant and had seen him at frequent intervals.
He reported that the defendant had given his clothes to different
cleaners because of his fear that they would be taken away from him.
He further reported that the defendant would refuse the food that was
offered to him and recounted that he had "observed on one particular
occasion after offering him food, that ... he went downstairs, reached
into a bag of dog food, which is a dry substance mixed with water, and
'
This witness concluded his testimony
he got himself a handful of it." 54
on an unexpected and dramatic note. Counsel inquired: "Would you
say ... [that the defendant] was getting better or worse towards the
end of your acquaintance?" The witness replied: "I would say worse,
basing it on what transpired . . . he was getting worse, and I might
add one thing: Walter's physical appearance at the present moment
he used to have jet black hair; it is no longer jet black." 55
This was the second time that a witness succeeded in directing all
eyes upon Walter Wilson. As judge and jury turned to look at him,
Walter was seen, his eyes fixed on the floor, rocking rhythmically in
his chair. His hair was not jet black.
The next witness was Dr. Brigette Julian, of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, the only medical member of the St. Elizabeth's staff who had
expressed a willingness to testify that the defendant was mentally ill.
Dr. Julian had seen Walter Wilson at a diagnostic staff conference at
53. Id. at 228 and 233.
54. Id. at 237-38.

55. Id. at 240.
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St. Elizabeth's and had reviewed the available information about him
at that time. 6
She declared that the patient had not displayed any "flagrantly
psychotic symptoms" at the conference.17 She expressed her opinion,
nonetheless, that he was suffering from mental illness.58
When asked by the court about the specific nature of the mental
illness she diagnosed, she said that "the label . . . [she] would have
put on it at that time would have been . . . an emotionally unstable

personality. 5 9
When asked by the court whether anybody at the staff conference agreed with her, she replied: "I think they said he was partly sick
but not sick enough to warrant diagnosis of mental illness - and I
think this is where we disagreed." 60
She added, still under questioning by the court, that she thought
"... that the majority of them felt that he was sick ....

They expressed

it in terms of his being incapable of functioning in the society and his
being very impulsive, incapable of sufficient controls in minor stress
situations ....

61

Nonetheless, she explained, in what appeared almost a paradoxical
fashion, that the staff conference did not reach the conclusion that
Walter Wilson was suffering from a mental disease or defect because
"his deviation from the normal was not sufficient to warrant the
diagnosis [of mental disorder] ."612
Dr. Julian expressed the opinion that the mental illness of the
defendant had been in existence on June 9, 1960.63
The court clearly had difficulty in accepting the assertion of the
witness that not every mentally ill person need be psychotic. The court
repeatedly inquired in such terms as these: "Not everybody that is
mentally ill is psychotic. What are they?" Her answer was: "Men64
tally ill."

When asked by the court as to what she meant by the words
"mentally ill," she replied:
I think mental illness takes many forms, and I do not know
whether I am expert enough to give you now a summary of those
symptoms which are common in all mental illness, but I think that
mentally ill people have more difficulty than others to deal with
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

243.
244.
244-45.
245.
246.

at 246-47.
at 247.
at 254.
at 254-55.
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stress situations in life; they are usually inefficient, they can very
easily be panicked. They might sometimes use ways of dealing
with problems in their life which seem to be rather irrational; they
don't seem to fit the purpose of what they try to achieve. They
have a very short frustration tolerance. They might show physical
symptoms of overt anxiety, of trembling, shaking, and blocking of
speech; these are only to name a few.65
When the court pursued by inquiring as to what specific symptoms
the defendant had, Dr. Julian replied:
The way I saw him in the conference was, as I said before,
I felt that some of his answers to questions showed very bad judgment. I felt that he was preoccupied so that he could hardly tear
himself away from his idea of hate, that he was very impulsive."6
Significantly, Dr. Julian declared in answer to defense counsel's
question as to whether or not it was possible to rule out the existence
of a psychotic episode on June 9, 1960 that it was not possible and "I
don't think that anybody at St. Elizabeth's Hospital would say that." 7
Cross-examination of Dr. Julian was essentially restricted to
showing that she had not observed any flagrant psychotic symptomatology about her patient.
Defense counsel attempted to conclude his redirect examination
of the witness with a question designed to shed light upon the psychiatric policy of the St. Elizabeth's staff which permitted it, as expressed
by Dr. Julian, to find a given individual sick, but not sick enough, to
be diagnosed as having a mental disorder.
The following transpired at that stage:
Q. You said the St. Elizabeth's doctors at the staff conference thought that he was sick, but not sick enough. How do
people happen to talk that way? I find it as difficult to follow
as the court.
A. This is my own, completely my own opinion. I have been
in John Howard Pavilion dealing with patients(The Court) Answer the question. The question is very
simple; there is nothing complicated about it. You said the staff

65. Id. at 255.
66. Id. at 255-56.
67. Id. at 269.
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conference was of the opinion that the man was mentally sick?

did you say

(Defense) Sick, but not sick enough; yes, sir.
(The Court)

-

sick, but not sick enough; is that right?

(The Witness) Yes.
How is that possible, was that your question?
By the Defense:
Q. Yes, Dr. Julian. Could you explain that to us?
A. My opinion is that most psychiatrists - very many psychiatrists, and particularly my colleagues - do think that people
who act out against society are sick, and(The Court) What is that again? Everybody that commits a
crime is mentally sick?
(The Witness) Is sick, yes.
(The Court) Do you believe that?
(The Witness) Yes.
(The Court) You don't believe in free will, then?
(The Witness) I don't know what it is.
(The Court) You don't know what free will is?
(The Witness) What do you mean by that?
(The Court) Don't you understand what free will is? You
are a psychiatrist and you don't know what I mean when I say
free will?
(The Witness) No, I don't.
(The Court) Don't I have a will of my own to do as I please?
(The Witness) Could you take a concrete example?
(The Court) Suppose I want to go up to a movie this afternoon, I could go, couldn't I, if I chose to?
(The Witness) Yes.
(The Court) I could go up and buy a suit of clothes or a hat.
I could go to a football game. I could do any number of things.
I could exercise the free will to do what I want to do. You never
heard of free will before?
(The Witness) This is what you call free will?
(The Court) What do you call it? Is there anything different ?
Isn't it a person's ability to make up his mind to do something?
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(The Witness) I thought you wanted to know about a perto make up their mind not to do something, which
son's ability
might
be different.
(The Court) That is free will; you have a will to do it or
not to do it, don't you ?
(The Witness) I think not in all cases, no.
(The Court) When you said the staff conference concluded
the man was sick, but wasn't sick enough, I assume that you
meant by that that he was suffering from some mental deficiency.
(The Witness) From mental illness.
(The Court) That is the same thing, isn't it?
(The Witness) Yes."8
The court pursued its questioning of the witness with such zeal as
to bring out the presence of the jury - in clear violation of a statutory
prohibition - that the defendant had been found by St. Elizabeth's
Hospital to be mentally competent to stand trial."9
An immediate motion for a mistrial, based upon the comment,
was denied.70 However, the court instructed the jury to disregard
that remark.
Walter Wilson had for once been following the proceedings
with keen interest. Although rocking in his chair sporadically, he had
fixed his eyes upon Dr. Julian whose testimony appeared all-absorbing
to him. His restlessness, however, seemed to mount during this period.
When counsel saw him briefly in the cell block during a recess
prior to the resumption of Dr. Julian's testimony, he was visibly
agitated. He was pacing up and down, grasping the bars of the cell,
and shouting, something like: "They lie. Why do they all lie ?"
Counsel felt at that time that he could very readily succeed in
reassuring the boy. On one or two previous occasions, a reassuring
comment made by him within the cell block had resulted in his seeming
visibly relaxed and more "normal" in appearance at the counsel table.
68. Id. at 270-72.
69. Id. at 272-73; Cf., Horton v. United States, 317 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
for the underlying statutory enactment barring the disclosure to the jury of an
accused's competency to stand trial see 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949). The section provides
inter alia:

A finding by the judge that the accused is mentally competent to stand trial
shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as a defense to the
crime charged; such finding shall not be introduced in evidence on that issue nor
otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury.

70. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Criminal No. X,
p. 274.
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While the case appeared to have been going well it seemed clear
that whatever points had been scored by the defense in the courtroom
had been based primarily upon a showing of psychotic as distinct from
non-psychotic psychopathology.
One remembers with ease in such a context the instances in which
a skillful prosecutor had destroyed the claim of a psychotic illness by
dwelling upon the defendant's appearance of "normalcy" at the counsel
table, and ascribing even pronounced manifestations of anxiety to
"normal" apprehension or a sense of guilt. 7 '
It was the judgment of the defense counsel at that time that the
boy's rocking at the counsel table constituted in many ways evidence indispensable to the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
at the hands of an average jury, such as that in the instant case.
Counsel therefore deliberately desisted from providing any reassuring comments in: response to the boy's increasing agitation.
Redirect examination was resumed subsequently and produced the
following disclosures:
By the Defense:
Q. Doctor Julian, do you know whether or not the diagnostic
procedures used upon the defendant at St. Elizabeth's would have
been different had he'been placed in, say, the Dix Pavilion rather
than the John Howard Pavilion?
A. I don't 't hink the procedures would have been different.
Q. What would have been different?
A. In what way and for what reason?
(Prosecution) Your Honor, I object to this; it is immaterial.
(The Court) Well, I am interested in knowing why it would
be different. You examine a patient - I don't care whether it is
in a pavilion, Howard Hall, or where it is - if a psychiatrist
reaches a conclusion - I am interested to hear the answer of
this witness.

71. The following provides striking illustrative material. Mr. Hantman, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, in his closing argument to the jury in United States v. Stewart, Crim.
No. 633-53 (D.D.C. 1952), stated as follows:
There is one real, important factor in this case that has not been discussed.
You weigh, ladies and gentlemen, everything that the defense psychiatrists have
told you about the illness this defendant has, and its severity and its degree and
stack it up against the defendant's demeanor all four weeks he has been here.
If he was as sick as these doctors have indicated, you should have seen the
demonstrations here.
Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Stewart, Crim. No. 633-53 (D.D.C.
1962), at 2204.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss2/2

44

Arens: The Defense of Walter X Wilson: An Insanity Plea and a Skirmish i
WINTER

1966]

DEFENSE OF WALTER X.

WILSON

(The Witness) I think that it would be different because of
the fact that most of the patients in John Howard Pavilion have
criminal charges, and I think that psychiatrists cannot completely
disregard what this implicates that they have from the charges,
and also cannot discard their court experience; and it is just my
opinion, but I feel that many psychiatrists feel that they are not
used as informants in court, but they are used as tools to kill the
Durham rule in the District, and they are often made fools of,
and that they are in some way(The Court) What is this? Used as tools to kill the Durham
rule; is that what you said?
(The Witness) This is my impression.
(The Court) What psychiatrists have been used to kill
the Durham rule?
(The Witness) I think this is a deduction some have drawn
from the way they have been used in their position as expert
witnesses.
(The Court) Who?
(The Witness) Colleagues of mine.
(The Court) Who? What doctors, what psychiatrist has told
you he is being used as a tool to kill the Durham rule?
(The Witness) I didn't say they exactly said to me these
words; this is my impression from talking to them about their
court experience.
(The Court) Who did you talk to?
(The Witness) I have talked; for instance, have discussed
cases like the one of [Walter Wilson] and others, where there was
a dissenting opinion about whether the patient had or had not a
mental disorder.
(The Court) I am not concerned with that. All I want to
know is what psychiatrists you talked to that gave you the impression they were used as tools in court to kill the Durham rule?
(The Witness) I think the physicians in the conference.
(The Court) You got the impression after talking to Doctor
Platkin and Doctor Read that they were being used as tools in
court to kill the Durham rule; is that right?
(The Witness) Yes, but this is my formulation. They did
not say that, I would like to state(The Court) What did they say from which you got the
impression?
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(The Witness) They have said to me that they feel they are
not used in order to give objective information, but their testimony is used to some extent to help the court make the decision
which(The Court) The court make the decision?
(The Witness) Let me say it this way: They feel that they
are not basically used as informants. They say they are(The Court) They say that they are used as informants?
(The Witness) No, that they are not used to give expert
information only.
(The Court) They are not used to give expert information.
What are they used for?
(The Witness) I think that they think that their semantics
and semantics here in court are very different.
(The Court) I don't know what you're talking about. You
mean my semantics and the doctors' are different?
(The Witness) Yes. And they feel that their information,
that the questions they are asked are not asked in order so much
to - it is not tried enough to understand what they are talking
about.
(The Court) Do you know that is a very serious statement
you are making?
Are Doctor Platkin and Doctor Read here?

(Prosecution) Not yet. Doctor Platkin is on call.
(The Court) And Doctor Read?
(Prosecution) I don't have Doctor Read.
(The Court) Do you have him?
(Defense) No, Your Honor.
(The Court) I want him.
Now, in order to understand you correctly, you have had a
conversation with Doctor Platkin and Doctor Read(The Witness) Yes.
(The Court) - from which you gather the impression, from
what they told you, that they were being used in court as tools to
kill the Durham rule; is that your testimony?
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(The Witness) Yes, that was my impression. 72
Diagnostic practices at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, as described by
Dr. Julian, had not been unknown to knowledgeable members of the
Bar. This, however, in no way detracted from the startling quality
of her testimony which was visibly disturbing to the legal members of
the audience for differing reasons.
The next witnesses that day were psychologists, drawn from St.
Elizabeth's and D.C. General Hospitals respectively.
Judge Curran had in the past repeatedly expressed the view that
psychologists were not properly qualified to testify as to the existence
or non-existence of mental illness. Counsel for defendant had therefore prepared a memorandum of law designed to show the acceptability
of psychological testimony in such cases and had filed it with the court
7
preliminary to the calling of the first psychologist.
The psychologists in this case furnished significant corroborative
74
evidence of Walter Wilson's psychopathology.
Dr. Catherine Beardsley, the first psychologist to testify, after
setting forth specific tests she had administered, which included the
Wechsler Memory Scale, the Benton Visual Retention Test, a test of
concept formation, a test of visual motor coordination, the BenderGestalt, the Rorschach, the Projective Drawing Test and the Szondi,
gave the following findings:
Personality tests revealed a severe state of anxiety, more than
we saw in 1956. It was the kind of anxiety which we find, in this
boy, associated with an actual fear that his feelings, particularly
his less pleasant feelings, will burst out in action before he has a
chance to control them. When a person is in this state of fear it
is a kind of fear which we sometimes think of as almost panic.
I also saw in the test material an attempt to try to do something about his feeling of fear, and so much energy, that is, think72. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Crim. No. X, pp.

276, 281.

73. This memorandum preceded the filing of the formal brief in support of the
proposition that psychologists were entitled to testify as to the existence or nonexistence of a mental illness in Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
74. A psychologist observing the case for another N.I.H. project reported as
follows:
The three psychologists who had tested the defendant in this particular case
were all experienced and well-qualified clinical psychologists. Their test batteries
overlapped considerably. Their test results and interpretations, when heard, were
very similar. This agrees with a finding of a preliminary questionnaire given to
psychologists who have testified in court. 'Either psychologists tend to testify on
the same side of the bar or their findings are not that discrepant.'
Scheflen, The Psychologist as a Witness, supra note 20, at 333.
In my experience in the litigation of cases involving mental health I too have
found the findings of psychologists in given instances to be markedly similar - in
contrast to the findings of psychiatrists.
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ing in all his waking hours, so much energy going into trying
to protect himself against these fears that he had very little left for
appropriate behavior and relationship to the outside world.
I also found a tendency in this boy to not be able to tolerate
his own feelings or to be able to see in himself what he really was
thinking and feeling and, hence, the necessity for finding the blame
for what he did or what he might do on the outside world. This is
what we call projection; that is the technical term for it.
One of the ways in which this person tried to cope with this
fear of the outbreak of his emotions and his impulses was to run
blindly away from an immediate situation. We have here a personality - may I interrupt a moment here to go back to the socalled average person, the functioning person. Ordinarily, our
emotional life, our emotions and our intelligence work pretty well
together in the personality. Sometimes we become a little disabled
to too strong emotions or situations arising from strong emotions,
but ordinarily the average person can manage to go along.
The thing which I found reflected in the tests of Mr. [Wilson]
was a failure of emotions and intelligence to be integrated in the
way in which we expect them to be personalitywise in a person
who functions with the average range.15
The next witness called by the defense, Dr. Levy, had waited for
at least two days within the witness room and courthouse corridor.
Significantly, he displayed no irritation at his loss of time. As the trial
continued he expressed concern over the effect of the continuing stress
upon the boy. Taking the witness stand for the defense, Dr. Levy
testified as follows in response to questioning:
Q. Now, would you report to the court and the jury first on
the results of your clinical interview and tests and, second, upon
your interpretation of those results.
A. I entered the meeting with the defendant expecting some
amount of resistance from the defendant because this is fairly
common. I was quite startled early in the interview when the
defendant said something that made me pick up my ears. He said
in a rather low and intense voice that he doesn't deserve all of
this, and I decided at that moment to pursue that particular issue
rather than something else, and he told me that he did not deserve
the treatment, the good treatment he was receiving, the excellent
lawyer he had, and the consideration that he has been receiving
from many people at the hospital.
75. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Crim. No. X, p. 286.
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Following that he began to tell me that one of the reasons
he felt that he didn't deserve the treatment he had received was
because of a feeling that he had that he was responsible for a
variety of deaths.
Now, at this point I couldn't quite understand the content of
what the defendant had said. I think it would have taken several
more interviews, but I had the impression that he felt some of his
words and some of his deeds were unacceptable to family, and
because of this they were feeling discouraged and negative about
him, and that ultimately because of these feelings they would have
to succumb in some fashion, but, as I say, I was quite puzzled
about this aspect of the interview.
Following that he told me something about the accident that
had taken place, and just prior to describing the accident he told
me about his difficulties with the police, and he restricted it to
the police in Precinct 8.
Now, he described this in a rather detailed fashion indicating
to me that he felt the police were continually after him, that he was
never safe, that anything that would occur in the area covered by
Precinct 8 would be attributed to the defendant. He knew two
officers in particular who were always reactive, always ready and
willing to apprehend him independent of whether he had committed any crime.
He made one statement that I thought was very very interesting because he said to me, 'They have two cars. There is a green
Hudson and a gold Hudson, and I would know these cars anywhere. If you were to put the green Hudson in with one hundred
green Hudsons exactly the same there is something about this
policeman's car that I would sense and I would be able to recognize it even though they were all identical.'
Q. What is the interpretation you attach to that statement,
Doctor Levy?
A. This statement and the previous statement about the police
made me feel that the defendant was describing a delusion he had
about the police in that precinct.
Then he went on to indicate that he began to feel very uncomfortable, very tense, while he was in the car and didn't sense that
there was anything he could do, and he began to speed and began
to weave, and he had in mind finding a tree, and without any
thought about his own safety he was eager to find that tree and
then drive directly into it.
It was obvious from the way he described this that what must
have taken place was a severe panic reaction, one in which he had
virtually no control over his judgment or his impulses.
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Q. Doctor Levy, did your tests in any way corroborate the
conclusions that you drew from your clinical interview?
A. They did.
Q. Would you describe the tests, their results and your interpretations thereof?
A. The ink blot test - it is kind of unfortunate that it is
called a test; it is not. It is a guided interview. The things that
are used are ink blots and they are relatively standard and they
are given to a subject or a patient, and the patient is asked to
indicate what is seen on the ink blots.
The notion behind this is that the patient will see things on
the ink blots and in
the ink blots which are mirrored in the way
76
he sees the world.
The court excluded a statement by the witness as to his opinion
concerning the defendant's state of mind on June 9, 1960. In the words
of the court: "He is not qualified to give a medical opinion as to
'77
whether he has schizophrenia or not; not in this court.
The line of questioning, therefore, followed a somewhat modified
pattern, and defense counsel stressed the fact that he was calling for a
psychological rather than any other kind of professional opinion from
78
the witness.
Q. Doctor Levy, would you explain tothe court and the jury
from your clinical interview and the test results that you obtained
from this defendant the state of the defendant's personality as of the
time of the examination in as much detail as you feel appropriate.
A. I think the most striking thing about the defendant's personality is the fact that it is covered over at the moment by a
variety of psychological processes that keep it from coming into
view. By analogy it is as though he were so terribly nervous that
he couldn't express his essential self because there is something
very very central in all of us that is ourselves and our uniqueness,
and his essential uniqueness cannot come out because of the interfering processes. The major process that is interfering with the
expression of himself is a very very gross disorder of thinking,
that is, he cannot reason logically, his ideas are peculiar to himself
and probably not shared by anybody else. They are a result of a
whole set of feelings, seething and very intense feelings that early
in life should have been controlled, but now, because of some con76. Id. at 289-90.
77. Id. at 309.
78. Id. at 310-11. Since the trial of this case, the Court of Appeals had explicitly
ruled in Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962), that appropriately
qualified clinical psychologists were entitled to propound opinions as to the existence

or non-existence of a mental illness and that the exclusion of such opinions constituted
error, warranting reversal.
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dition, he is unable to control, so that these feelings, very primitive
feelings, of love and hate and aggression, and attempts to do
violence, at least thoughts about this, violence to himself and to
others, all of these things are seething and can't find expression
easily because he hasn't gotten to the point in his life history to
control these feelings.
In every instance this was apparent in the interview but
made very dramatic in the ink blot test, where in every instance
and in every ink blot he portrayed this kind of mixed up and
confused idea of what the world is about.
Q. Now, do you have a psychological opinion, Doctor Levy,
as to the length of time that this confused state of mind has existed
within the defendant, [Walter X. Wilson] ?
A. At the time that I worked with the defendant I had the
opinion that this disease process, this psychological set of defects,
was so intense, so severe, that it could have only developed over
a long period of time.

Q. Is it fair to conclude then, Doctor Levy, it was in existence on June 9, 1960?
A. Yes.
Q. What would the effects of that state of mind have been
on the mental and emotional processes of the defendant in specific
terms ?
A. For that period of time, at least, as he described it to me
just prior to the accident, it would have robbed him of whatever
reason and control he had, and would have enabled them all of the
impulses that he has been coping with throughout his life to find
access and to motivate his behavior. At that time I think he was a
very primitive person, and a person without a shred of judgment.79
When asked by the court about the specific responses of the patient
to Rorschach Card No. 1, the witness replied:
'It looks like two bears. Two men got ahold of the bears, but
they have got one hand free. The bears are trying to get away,
but they can't because they are stuck to the men. It looks like the
bears are bleeding because they are all torn up. French poodles are
working on the bear; they got ahold of him, they are biting him.'
79. My technique in this matter appears to have been observed with approval by
a psychologist, observing the case for another N.I.H. project who reported that I "was
often able to get a reply by prefacing . . . [my] question with, 'your psychological
opinion' - or, 'in your opinion as a psychologist ." Scheflen, The Psychologist as a
Witness, supra note 20, at 331.
80. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Crim. No. X, pp. 311-14.
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Defense counsel thereupon asked him to give the patient's response
to Card No. 2, and the witness replied:
'It looks like two rabbits. They are fighting, they are trying
to mash the little butterfly. Two ducks up here are arguing who
is going to win, who is going to do it. Two little needles are trying
to stick one another. It looks like they are crying. They are
arguing who is going to win.'""
The witness added upon further questioning:
In addition, there is a good deal of aggressiveness in these
cards, 'sticking' and 'bleeding'; a good deal of conflict among
animals or objects indicating a lack of differentiation and an attribution of human characteristics - things like needles and things
like animals - almost as though the patient couldn't distinguish
between the blot and what else there might have been.
Members of the jury visibly winced at this description.
Referring again to the Rorschach cards, Dr. Levy made this
observation about Walter Wilson's responses to them:
Most people approach these in a way which suggest they
understand there is a blot and this is a task to do. The defendant
didn't do that. He got right into it. And all of this conflict and
the piling together of all sorts of things and making one thing out
of it all strongly suggest a severe disorder of thinking.
Defense counsel was impelled to inquire at this point:
Doctor Levy, would it be fair to conclude that you would not
expect this kind of response to a Rorschach from [the prosecution],
or me, or members of the jury, or the court?
Dr. Levy replied: "I would not."8 "
The last psychologist to testify during that trial day was Mrs.
Florence Kirby, who had administered the initial battery of psychological tests at the D.C. General Hospital in 1956 and had then administered a fresh battery at defense counsel's request in 1961. Mrs. Kirby
was an elderly lady with a sense of mission about the role of the psychologist in mental examinations. Her testimony was marked by a
tone of fervent conviction and occasional indignation at the frequent
attempts at disparagement of her testimony by the judge as inferior
to that of a medical expert.8 8
81. Id. at 335-36.

82. Id. at 336.
83. Id. at 337.
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She reported that at the time of her first psychological examination
of Walter, which included the standard psychological tests, "Walter was
showing the beginnings of a psychotic process or disorganization in his
thinking ...

"

The balance of her testimony provided persuasive evi-

84
dence of the fact that Walter had seriously deteriorated since that time.
When the court inquired with some degree of skepticism as to
whether it was in her power to "give a Rorschach test alone and nothing else and reach a conclusion as to a man's mental condition," her
"Yes, sir" provided answer, affirmation and protest at the same time.8
Mrs. Kirby testified that she had spent a period of approximately
three days testing Walter preliminary to the present trial in 1961.8"
The forcefulness of her testimony and its easy acceptability to a lay
audience, notwithstanding her occasional employment of technical terminology, was highlighted with the following questions and answers:

By the Defense:
Q. Would you tell the court and the jury about the results
that you obtained from the Rorschach test ?
A. Well, the Rorschach test showed that this boy was in a
much worse condition than he was on the previous date, that his
fantasy life had increased tremendously, and that it had taken on
a much more assaultive, much more gruesome type of content, and
a much more hostile content, and a desire for vengeance, a retaliation against society or the world at large.
Also that his ego strength, or that part of the personality
which had determined what is right or wrong by social standards,
had decreased considerably; it was only about half [what] it was
the previous time.
Also, that his control of his emotions, which is also indicated
by the strength ego, had decreased tremendously. He was no
longer able to control or to show foresight and determine the consequences of his conduct nearly as well - in fact, it was almost nil
at this time as compared to the earlier test.
And much of his hostility was - practically all of his hostility
was directed outward against other people.
At this time, this last test, there was no evidence on any tests
that showed this boy had any feelings of conscience or regret; he
was completely swallowed up with thoughts of hostility, of veng84. See, e.g., Id. at 342, 344.
85. Id. at 342.
86. Id. at 343.
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eance, of being captured, and escape, and electrocution, and all
etcetera, associated with his present life.
Q. Mrs. Kirby, doesn't this make him as identifiable as easily
as a bad boy as a sick boy?
A. No, because of the difference in the strength of the ego
from the two dates shows that this boy has lost control, voluntary
control of his behavior. Also that his intellect has been so warped
by his fantasy that he no longer sees things as real, as they actually
are; he no longer interprets reality as it actually is; he is, in a
sense, obsessed with these fantasies to a degree that he cannot stop
them nor control them."
Succeeding questions were designed to pinpoint the existence of
the mental illness in traditional terms.
Q. Do you believe this boy had control over his actions on
June 9, 1960?
A. No. I think not.
Q. Do you believe, Mrs. Kirby, this boy had an understanding
of the nature and quality of his actions on June 9, 1960?
A. I do not.8 8
Referring to the results of the Thematic Apperception Test, she
pointed out that what was characteristic of the responses "was that
each of these gave a short picture into this boy's home life, and it
seemed to be permeated with erratic punishment, with rather unstable
ethics, a great deal of severe punishment, and a great deal of rejection,
and the actual pushing the boy out of the home, a play for dominance
among the members of the home, and the boy feeling that he was
unloved and not wanted and actually being pushed out of the door
and out on the street, which, to him, in the story is about as dramatic
as walking a gang plank into the Atlantic Ocean."8 9 Those are the
87. Id. at 346-47.
88. Id. at 347-48. It appeared ironic that the court which barred testimony by
psychologists as to the existence of a schizophrenic mental state permitted psychologists
to testify that the defendant lacked control over his actions and understanding of their
nature and quality.
The employment of traditional terms designed to pinpoint defects in the volitional
and cognitive capacities of the defendant was helpful to the insanity defense insofar
as it was based upon psychotic symptomatology.
Adoption of the Durham rule has not barred "all use of the older tests: testimony
given in their terms may still be received if the expert witness feels able to give it ...
in resolving the ultimate issue 'whether the accused acted because of a mental disorder.'
In aid of such a determination the court may permit the jury to consider whether or
not the accused understood the nature of what he was doing ...

."

Douglas v. United

States, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
89. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Crim. No. X, p. 352.
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conclusions. This test tells more about the inter-personal relations with
the patient and the people around him, particularly his family and those
close to him than any other test.
In point of fact it appeared to the defense counsel, as a layman,
that Mrs. Kirby's interpretation of these results was in many ways
more revealing about the home life of the boy than much of the
available psychiatric testimony.
There was no cross-examination of Mrs. Kirby.
Looking back upon the testimony of the three psychologists at
this stage, it appeared that the value of this kind of testimony to the
trial lawyer was in many ways as high as the best psychiatric testimony
available. In some respects, moreover, 9it0 provided perspectives which
were not furnished by the psychiatrists.
At the end of that trial day, defense counsel received a report from
Dr. Charles Goshen, who had agreed to serve as a sur-rebuttal witness
for the defense, that the defendant had, in his opinion, become mentally
incompetent to participate in the proceedings as a result of the accumulating stress.
VI1.
THE FOURTH DAY

OF THE TRIAL

Upon the resumption of the trial the defendant's counsel informed
the court of Dr. Goshen's findings at a bench conference. The court
was further informed at that time by the prosecution that the government had doctors who would "look him over" in aid of a judicial
determination of competency to proceed in the case. 9
At the conclusion of this session, defense counsel requested both
Dr. Ryan and Dr. Salzman to make a further examination of the defendant as to his competency to stand trial.
90. A psychologist observing the case for another N.I.H. project had these
comments:

The psychologists's orientation in behavioral processes should lead him to
think of mental illness in terms that are relatively clear and understandable. In
addition, the specificity of his psychological tests offers a framework within which
objective facts and observations can be offered. Also, the relative recency of
psychology has forced those trained in this field to be prepared to defend the
validity of their findings. ..

.

...the psychologists in the case observed seemed to have done little previous
testifying in the courtroom. Although questioned at great length by both the
prosecuting attorney and the judge, they remained calm and definite in manner.
This was probably due to their training in the description of behavior, the fact
that their answers were anchored in the test material and to their knowledge of
the rebuttals to arguments concerning clinical psychological testing. The jury
was very attentive to all of their testimony and one had the feeling that their
testimony was accepted favorably.
Scheflen, The Psychologist as a Witness, supra note 20, at 331, 334.
91. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Crim. No. X, p. 356.
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Dr. Ryan telephoned defense counsel immediately after his examination to inform him of his opinion that the defendant was clearly
incompetent to stand trial. He pointed to an unmistakable deterioration in the defendant's condition and added that he thought the defendant was suffering from the delusion that his counsel had undergone
a total change in appearance which suggested to him that he could no
longer trust him and that he was part of the plot which had "rigged"
the trial against him. In the opinion of Dr. Ryan the defendant was
no longer capable of assisting counsel or participating in the proceedings. In the course of a later discussion, Dr. Ryan told defense counsel
that he strongly felt that something had occurred in the lawyer-client
relationship in this case to help bring about this situation.
Dr. Salzman, in contrast, had no such feeling for the boy or the
case. He telephoned at the conclusion of his examination to inquire
as to what all the fuss was about, declared that he felt that the defendant
was clearly competent to confer with counsel and assist in his own
defense and reported the defendant as stating that he regarded Dr.
Salzman and his counsel as the two best friends he had in the world.

VIII.
THE FIFTH DAY OF THE TRIAL

A conference preceded the opening of the fifth day of the trial.
The judge informed prosecuting and defense counsel that he had
received letters from Doctors Platkin and Cushard of St. Elizabeth's
expressing their respective opinions that the defendant was com2
petent to proceed in his defense.
He further informed both counsel that he had received a letter from
Dr. Ryan to the contrary and he added that he just did not know what
to make of so sharp a conflict of opinion among reputable professional
men. He inquired whether any further evidence was available upon
the subject.
Defense counsel informed the judge and prosecuting counsel that
Dr. Goshen was available to testify as to the defendant's lack of competency at this time, adding that Dr. Salzman had informed him that
defendant was, in his opinion, competent.
Proceedings thereupon were resumed in open court. The court
heard evidence outside the hearing of the jury. Dr. Goshen testified
92. As was shown by the hospital records of St. Elizabeth's, obtained at a later
date, the interview which led Drs. Platkin and Cushard to pronounce Walter Wilson
competent to stand trial produced evidence that Walter Wilson expressed the delusion
"that he had killed four boys, two of whom he knew, in Rock Creek Park and buried
,
'.
I
their bodies."
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that in his opinion the defendant was at that stage "unable to understand the nature of the proceedings . . . and unable to rationally participate in his own defense. . ...Is9He added that "the trial itself as
accompanied by incarceration in the jail ... constitutes a great stress
on him to the point where when I saw him . .. he was suicidal at
that time." 94
Cross-examination of Dr. Goshen followed traditional paths and
did not produce answers favorable to the hypothesis of competence:
Q. He [the defendant] knows he was in an automobile
collision on June 9, 1960, does he not?
A. Yes.
Q. He knows that four people lost their lives as a result of
that collision, does he not?
A. That's right.
Q. He knows that he was going at an excessive rate of speed
on this day, does he not?
A. That's right.
Q. He knows [defense counsel] is his attorney, does he not?
A. That's right.
Q. He has consulted with [defense counsel], to your knowledge, has he not?
A. That's right.
Q. He has exchanged information with [defense counsel],
has he not?
A. To some extent. He has also withheld information.
Q. Is there something wrong with that exchange of information between he and [defense counsel] ?
A. Yes, he has been usually uncooperative with his defense
attorneys. Two previous attorneys have quit in the case after having been assigned by the court because of lack of cooperation, and
the present attorney has gotten a very minimum degree of cooperation and has had to go pretty much on his own.9 5
Defense counsel concluded his redirect examination of Dr. Goshen
by asking him to assume that the defendant was competent and then
asking him whether he "or any other psychiatrist [could] give the
93. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v. Wilson, Crim. No. X, p. 362.
94. Id. at 363.
95. Id. at 366-67.
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court a reasonable assurance that the defendant .. . [would] remain
competent for the balance of the trial ...?"

This in turn resulted in the following colloquy:
A. No. I think the situation could change momentarily and
I think his history has shown his wide fluctuation in behavior
points where - to levels of behavior where sometimes he impresses people as being a very nice likeable young boy, which he
is sometimes, and other times he is socially destructive, impulsive,
reckless, undergoing seriously disturbed thinking, and this could
happen within minutes - today, for example.
Q. Is it possible that he would have full awareness of the
charges, the nature of the proceeding at this time and drift off
into a dreamland of his own sometime during the day, or perhaps
the next day?
A. That's right; within the same hour, even.96
The court thereupon declared as follows:
(The Court) It has been agreed that the court should consider
the report of Doctor Cushard, Doctor Platkin, Doctor Ryan, and
the testimony of Doctor Goshen.
Doctor Cushard has reported that he concludes that [Walter
X. Wilson] is mentally competent to stand trial and understand
the nature of the proceedings against him, and properly assist
counsel in his own defense.
Doctor Platkin expresses an opinion that [Walter X. Wilson]
is competent to stand trial and understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and properly assist counsel in his own defense.
Doctor Goshen has testified in his opinion he is not competent to stand trial, and Doctor Ryan reports that at the present
time Mr. [Wilson] appears to be in a state of acute psychotic
turmoil. This is dated March 31, 1961. And it is possible that
he may erupt in violent behavior in court. He feels convinced that
his lawyer has undergone a total change in appearance which suggests to him that he can no longer trust his attorney because he
too is in a plot against him. He views the jury as constantly
changing in makeup from almost all men to almost all women, or
almost all colored to almost all white. He is also presently disoriented as to time whereas he was correctly oriented a week ago.
96. Id. at 370.
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Throughout the examination he showed considerably more confusion and disorder in logical thinking than he did [two weeks
ago]. It is thus my opinion that Mr. [Wilson] is not now competent to stand trial.
The picture presents itself as two psychiatrists expressing an
opinion that he is competent to stand trial, and two psychiatrists
expressing an opinion that he is not capable to stand trial. The
condition of the record is such that I hold that he is not capable of
standing trial and I will declare a mistrial.
Counsel for the Government will prepare the proper order.
He will be committed to St. Elizabeth's."

Ix.
POST-TRIAL EVENTS

Some time after the defendant's commitment to St. Elizabeth's
Hospital the defense filed a motion for the appointment, at government
expense, of Doctors Schultz, Ryan, and Goshen for further mental
examination of the defendant.
A motion filed with the court stated in substance as follows:
1. All three experts testified in the last trial of the defendant
(which has resulted in the declaration of a mistrial) that the defendant
was mentally ill; one of them testified that defendant had reached a stage
of mental incompetence to participate in the proceedings, apparently
under the stress of the trial itself, and another transmitted a certification
to the court to that effect.
2. The defendant is now in the custody of St. Elizabeth's Hospital which, since 1956, has maintained a consistent disagreement with
the medical authorities of the D.C. General Hospital as well as other
doctors as to the mental state of the defendant.
3. The defendant is entitled to the full weight and benefit of all
psychiatric expert evidence in his favor, brought up-to-date, both on
the question of his competency as well as on the question of whether,
97. Id. at 370-72.
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upon the date charged in the indictment, he was suffering from mental
illness and whether such mental illness, if found to exist, was significantly related to the crimes charged in the instant case.
4. The defendant will be seriously handicapped in his trial if,
while the St. Elizabeth's physicians whose testimony is likely to be
adverse to defendant's claims are put in a position of fortifying their
views and bringing them up-to-date as a result of an extra 90 days'
examination, the physicians favoring the defendant's claim of mental
illness are prevented from doing likewise by appropriate additional
examinations and observations.
As defense counsel, in the course of oral argument, set forth the
facts of the case underlying the motion, beginning with the initial diagnosis of mental illness in 1956 and the subsequent rejection of that
diagnosis and discharge of the boy by St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the
same year, the Judge said:
This is certainly a sad commentary on our handling of these
psychiatric cases, where these psychiatrists are debating among
themselves and as a result a man of this nature can go out and kill
four innocent people. It isn't the first time it's happened. I am
afraid it isn't going to be the last. It is, I think, one of the greatest
blots on our system of justice that I know of. .

...

'

The defense secured another court order directing St. Elizabeth's
to furnish it with photostatic copies of the new set of hospital records
developed pursuant to the latest commitment.
When counsel visited Walter Wilson at St. Elizabeth's Hospital,
he requested him to keep a chart showing specifically what doctor had
seen him and for what length of time.
Upon his next visit Walter informed him that the chart had been
taken from him by one of the attendants who had told him that if he
persisted in such activities he would be asking for trouble. Counsel
asked Walter to persist nonetheless. Toward the end of the ninety-day
period, Walter's chart, which he had managed to keep this time, showed
approximately five interviews with medical staff members of the hospital. Significantly, at the conclusion of the ninety-day period of observation, St. Elizabeth's Hospital reported that the patient was mentally

98. United States v. Wilson, Crim No. X, Official Transcript of Proceedings
before Judge George L. Hart, Jr., April 28, 1961, 8-9.
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ill although competent to stand trial. The rationale for the finding of
a schizophrenic mental disorder was provided in the hospital records
in these terms:
Walter X. Wilson was readmitted to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital April 3, 1961, by order of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a period of not to exceed 90
days.... Opinions are requested as to the patient's present mental

condition, mental competency for trial, mental condition on or about
June 9, 1960 and causal connection between the mental disease or
defect if present and the alleged criminal act: Manslaughter....
The patient's account of the night of the alleged offense is
essentially the same as that given in the Medical Staff Conference
dated February 15, 1961, during the patient's second admission
to the hospital and will therefore not be repeated here. The patient
is considerably more emotionally disturbed now than during conference of February 15, 1961. Asked how he feels, the patient
says, 'scared and don't know what I'm scared of.' He says that
he sees no hope at all for the future. He says that half the people
in Washington are against him and the [Wilson] family and would
not even give them public assistance, as a result of which his
mother had to go out and work instead of staying at home. Questioned closely as to whether he really believes that half the people
in Washington are against him and his family he changes the
statement and says that all the people in Washington are against
them. He says that nobody in the world likes him and that he
does not like anyone and does not get along with anyone. He has
no desire to have anything to do with anyone either here in the
hospital or outside. He says that while driving the car he wanted
to kill himself and is sorry that he didn't. He says that there is no
reason for him to continue living. It is the impression of several
members of the conference that this patient's contact with reality
is quite tenuous and has been so particularly at certain times. He
is correctly oriented and his memory shows no signficant impairment. He does not express delusions, hallucinations or other
psychotic content. I should like to note at this time, however, that
Dr. Platkin and the writer [Dr. Cushard] examined this patient
at the D.C. Jail, on a court order, between his second and third
admissions to this hospital and at that time he expressed the
opinion that he had killed four boys, two of whom he knew, in
Rock Creek Park and buried their bodies. He said that he was
so convinced that he had done this that he went back to find the
graves and was unable to do so. For some time during that examination he insisted that this had actually happened, but finally
admitted that it might be an 'illusion.' Questioned about this
today he again states that it was an 'illusion.' He says that he
hates everyone so that if he continues to live he will hurt and kill
people. During parts of the examination the patient seems more
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absorbed in his own thoughts than in what is going on in the conference, but he does not become completely detached from reality.
Psychological testing showed the patient to have a full scale
I.Q. of 77, verbal I.Q. of 82, and performance I.Q. of 73, and his
probable maximum was estimated as at least average. He attained
the full scale I.Q. of 77 on the Wechsler adult intelligence scale as
compared with an I.Q. of 90 on the Stanford-Binet, when he was
in the hospital in 1956. The psychological test results reflected
conflict, extreme anxiety and panic over impulses for which the
patient has inadequate controls. Emotions are lived out directly
and immediately. The fear of loss of control is too great to be
tolerated for long and under stress may be projected on the environment. So much inner energy is used in the struggle for
mastery that very little is left for relating to the environment.
Language is functional and at times marked by looseness of associations and autistic coloring. Such a person can eventually move
into paranoid schizophrenia.
During his second admission to the hospital this patient was
diagnosed as without mental disorder because it was not believed
that he deviated sufficiently from normal to warrant a diagnosis
of mental disorder. It is the consensus of opinion at this time in
view of the patient's condition and subsequent examinations that
he is so disturbed that he does suffer from a mental disorder. It
is the consensus of opinion that simple schizophrenia is probably
the most accurate diagnosis which can be made, although not
entirely satisfactorily. It is also the consensus of opinion that the
patient was suffering from mental disorder on June 9, 1960, but
we are unable to arrive at a firm opinion as to whether or not there
was causal connection between the alleged criminal act and the
mental illness.
Diagnosis: 22.0 Schizophrenic Reaction Simple Type
Condition on Discharge: Unimproved
Recommendations: In our opinion:
1. He is mentally competent for trial.
2. He is suffering from a mental disorder and was in probability suffering from a mental disorder on or about June
9, 1960. We are unable to arrive at a valid opinion as to
whether the criminal acts if committed by him were the
products of a mental disorder.
Dr. Platkin appeared to be the sole dissenter from this viewpoint.
His assertion continued to be that the boy was free of all manner of
mental disorder.
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Doctors Ryan and Goshen who had checked upon their patient at
St. Elizabeth's Hospital, pursuant to court order toward the end of
the ninety-day period, agreed that he was then again competent to
stand trial although clearly schizophrenic.
The defense furnished the St. Elizabeth's photostats which it had
obtained to the U.S. Attorney's office, and suggested that this was a
case in which the government might not wish to contest the insanity
defense. And, in fact, the U.S. Attorney's office decided not to contest it.

X.
TEE SECOND TRIAL

The second trial was, of course, anticlimactic. A jury was waived.
The court received in evidence the transcript of testimony of the first
trial. It also heard the testimony of Dr. Charles Goshen, who had
re-examined the boy during his second sojourn at the hospital. There
was no cross-examination. There were no opposing witnesses.
The court entered a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity
and committed Walter to St. Elizabeth's Hospital until such time as
he could be certified as recovered and no longer dangerous to himself
or others.
The proceedings in their entirety did not consume more than
twenty minutes.

XI.
CONCLUSION

The emergent implications must be stated with reserve though
without hesitation. Had Walter Wilson's lawyer lacked the funds to
secure the psychiatric and psychological witnesses whose testimony has
been described in this article, the case would clearly not have ended
in acquittal, but in conviction.
If the war on poverty is to be extended into the domain of criminal
defense it would seem that the skirmish of United States v. Wilson
highlights the need for a greater investment in financial and human
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resources - particularly in the field of psychiatric and psychological
expertise - than it has received to date. The obstacles encountered
in this type of case seem deserving of the same attention given the
more publicized difficulties of modern criminal procedure.
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